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STRENGTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

**SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
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INTRODUCTION TO REVISED EDITION BY THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER WILEY, CHAIRMAN, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

On October 31, 1953, the Special Subcommittee on Security Affairs released a study on "Strength of the International Communist Movement."

In the introduction, I pointed out that my colleagues on the subcommittee, Senators Guy Gillette, of Iowa, and Homer Ferguson, of Michigan, shared my opinion that the nature of the study merited its being brought up to date from time to time, so as to be of maximum utility to the Congress and to the people.

NEW DATA COMPILED IN FEBRUARY 1954

The October print was based upon information originally collected from official sources in June 1953.

Since that time, numerous major developments have occurred throughout the world. Accordingly, I requested that there be compiled new data based on the country-by-country situation in February 1954.

The principal data in this present print consist, therefore, of the same type of information, brought up to date, as was contained in the original print. To this data, have now been added two new sections. These additions are based upon reactions to the earlier study, reactions, incidentally, which were uniformly favorable and exceedingly gratifying to the subcommittee.

SECTION 1—HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION

In the first section—a new one—of the present study, there is set forth with accompanying map a brief historical description which has been prepared by the Library of Congress at my request. It depicts the territorial expansion of Russia from earliest times. This section describes the successive geographical additions to the current "home base" from which international Communism—having secured control in November 1917—has itself further expanded.

SECTION 2—QUOTES ON NATURE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES

A second section has been established in order to clarify the nature of Communist Parties as such. This section consists of a few selected quotations from Communist sources, setting forth the strategy and tactics of Communist Parties throughout the world.

The quotations are confined, almost without exception, to the subject of Communist Parties as such and are not intended as an over commentary on any of the other phases of the theory or practice of communism.

My colleagues and I deemed it essential to include this section in order to convey a clearer understanding of the exact nature of the Communist movement.

After all, Communist Parties in Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, or North America are not mere parliamentary organizations of a type similar to democratic parliamentary groups. On the contrary, a Communist Party is a unique organization; "Our Party," the Communists have long told their members, "is not like other parties." It is a party, in the traditional sense, in name only.

The Communist Party is, in effect, an organizational weapon of combat aimed at the destruction of non-Communist states. It is, to all intents and purposes, an army, one of whose branches may be a parliamentary arm, but whose basic characteristics—centralized chain of command, iron discipline, offensive and defensive strategy and tactics—are fundamentally military.

It is a party which makes unique, total and perpetual demands upon its membership, the only parallel to which are the demands that an army of the most rigid dictatorial state imposes upon its troops in the field.

The reason for the military character of the party is, as set forth in the quotations in section 2, that the party's objective is a military one—the violent overthrow of the existing order through the waging of class warfare and so-called "liberation" warfare. These objectives, say the Communists, can only be fulfilled if military-type strategy and tactics are used—camouflage, espionage, sabotage, sedition by "vanguards," "shock-brigades," "general staffs," and other military and paramilitary forms.

The "highest form of the struggle follows the rules of warfare," (pp. 80-81) says the program of the Communist International, quoted in the second section of this study.

SECTION 3—REVISED DATA ON PARTIES' STRENGTH

How the "Armies of the Revolution" are waging their war is set forth in section 3. It consists of the revision of the country-by-country data, included in the original print, in addition to the previous region-by-region summary.

It is with the belief and expectation that this overall material will contribute to increased congressional and public understanding that it is presented herewith.

ALEXANDER WILEY.

MAY 1954.

INTRODUCTION TO ORIGINAL EDITION

By the Honorable Alexander Wiley

INTRODUCTION

The most unfortunate political phenomenon in the 20th century has been the rise to international power of the Communist movement.

From the smallest beginnings of a few doctrinaire zealots, communism has grown to such vast proportions as to threaten the freedom of the world. Moreover, under the cloud of the atomic and the hydrogen bombs, it threatens the very survival of western civilization, as we know it.

It is for the purpose of presenting a summary of the strength of the Communist movements throughout the world that this study has been compiled from official Government sources.

This study was prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Security Affairs because the subcommittee believes that an accurate understanding of worldwide Communist power is essential to a review of America's future international relations. Such an understanding can be gained not through sweeping global generalizations, but first through detailed review, country by country, region by region, and then through integrating the fragments into a whole picture.

So important is this approach in the eyes of the subcommittee members that Senator Guy M. Gillette, of Iowa, has suggested that a review of this nature should be made not just once but periodically. Similarly, Senator Homer Ferguson, of Michigan, has urged a continuing study of Communist activity throughout the world. As chairman of the subcommittee, I fully concur with their views.

LIMITATIONS ON STUDY

The basic material in this study consists therefore of two parts:

1. Statistics on the parliamentary status of Communist parties, their claimed or estimated membership, and a brief statement concerning their source of strength.
2. A region-by-region analysis of the objectives and tactics of communism.

Because of the brevity of this study, it does not purport to constitute anything but a limited review of this vast field. It does not, for example, examine at any length the huge area of fellow-traveler support.

In any event, political conditions vary so much, country by country, and region by region, that it can hardly be expected that a few descriptive lines or paragraphs can adequately portray the political story of a land or region. That story changes moreover so fast that some of the material compiled in this report as of 4 months ago may already be somewhat obsolete.

A number of observations may, however, be made concerning the data presented herein.

COMMUNISM'S GROWTH

1. Perhaps the most basic impression which will arise from this study is the very rapid growth of the Communist movement.

At the beginning of 1917, the Bolsheviks represented an extremist offshoot of the Russian Social Democratic Party. They numbered some 80,000 adherents within the Russian Empire and small numbers of supporters abroad. They had little direct influence on the political events of their time.

Within less than four decades, the Communists grew in strength until today, they control governments of one-third of the population and one-fourth of the area of the world. The Communist movement consists, moreover, of a vast network of national Communist Parties with some 24 million members operating in more than 60 countries.

This network feeds and is fed by a tremendous variety of national and international mass organizations, playing direct and indirect roles, wittingly or unwittingly, in the global Communist conspiracy for world dominion.

Therefore, for anyone at this late hour to underestimate the strength of the Communist movement is to be making not only a serious blunder of evaluation, but is to be guilty of what could prove to be a suicidal blindness. This is particularly true, in view of the Soviet military potential.

COMMUNISM'S REPEATED COMEBACKS

2. A second impression from this study is the apparent ability of the Communist movement within many countries and regions to survive all sorts of adversity due to governmental and private opposition.

The sheer fanaticism of the Communist adherents has enabled them to withstand shocks to which other less zealous movements might long since have completely succumbed.

Moreover, just as the Communists have proven their ability to survive internal legal attack, the Communist movement has proven its ability to survive external shock waves emanating from within the Kremlin itself. These shock waves have arisen out of the periodic purges which convulse Soviet society.

Again and again, many anti-Communists have been guilty of the error of assuming that a particular historic purge has "completely and permanently" disorganized the Soviet conspiracy throughout the world.

While purges have indeed caused disorganization, while countless lives have been snuffed out within Russia and in other countries, invariably the Communist movement has proven its ability to make impressive comebacks.

In any event, the history of the Communist growth has been neither steady nor gradual. It has consisted of 1-, 2-, or 3-year spurts during periods of extreme social disorganization and change. The last and most significant period was that following World War II when Communist leaders came to share and/or seize political power in many areas of Europe and Asia and when ultimate Communist ambitions exploded in direct military ventures, as in southeast Asia.

But in these and other lands, Communist success has alternated with Communist failure. Often, after Communist political parties have grown in strength, they have been outlawed, gone underground,

only to reemerge at a later date under some new guise and sometimes as strong or stronger than before.

The Communist leaders, trained and toughened in the hard Soviet schools of espionage, sabotage, and subversion, have proven themselves past masters at "holding out" during long periods of repression. That fact should be borne in mind in those lands where populations may come to feel complacent over legal steps taken against the Communist conspiracy.

COMMUNIST HOLD ON LABOR MOVEMENT

3. A third basic fact which emerges from the study is communism's emphasis on what it calls its "proletarian base."

In country after country, the principal growth of the Communist cancer may be found centered within the labor union movement. This is particularly true of industrialized societies. In underdeveloped countries, the Communists make every effort to promote industrialization. They do so, not as a means of improving the standard of living of the people, but in order to provide a larger proletariat from which the Communists hope, in accordance with their dogma, to draw increased strength.

The continued Communist ability to distort the rightful role of a free labor movement is a factor to give deep cause for concern to all friends of the rights of laboring men and laboring women.

It is a challenge to working people in all lands to resist the treacherous Communist appeals to class warfare and to unite with all other groups in the population in opposing Communist efforts.

THE FALLACY OF NUMBERS

4. Another factor which is soon noted is that in seeking to appraise Communist strength, one may quickly fall victim to what may be called a fallacy of numbers—small numbers or large numbers.

One may mistakenly assume that, because a Communist Party has won only a small number of seats in a particular parliament, that communism is not an important factor to be reckoned with in the political life of that land.

This notion is fallacious for a number of reasons.

In the first place, the Communists have time and again proven the extent to which even a small, highly disciplined group inside or outside a parliament (indeed, in virtually any organization) can succeed in a wrecking operation.

Secondly, the Communists in many instances prefer to keep the Communist Party as such, a small, tight "elite" organization. They often prefer to leave to mass, non-Communist parties and organizations, the principal overt task of moving the society in the direction the Communists want it to go.

Frequently, the Communists, by throwing strength at crucial times to left-wing Socialist groups, can far better attain an immediate goal, e. g., neutralism in a nation and/or their ultimate goal, communism, than if the Communists were to seek those objectives openly under their own auspices.

In the third place, in underdeveloped countries in particular, where there is a relative paucity of educated leaders, a mere handful of

highly articulate Communist MP's can wield strength, inside or outside a parliament, totally disproportionate to their actual strength.

In these lands, moreover, the Communists have proven that at a convenient time, a bullet fired by a hired assassin can often deprive a nation of a responsible, key prodemocratic leader and can thereby set the stage for Communists or their fellow travelers to take over.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that under the quickly changeable conditions of today, a small Communist minority can become a Communist majority within but a short period of time.

Oftimes some observers profess to be surprised when communism "breaks out" in a particular area, as, for example, when it won its recent parliamentary majority in British Guiana. Actually a closer analysis will show how a particular "outbreak," far from being sudden, actually represents the fruit of years of industrious work by picked Communist agitators.

There is another basic aspect to the fallacy of numbers: that is to fall victim to the mistaken notion that a large Communist vote in a particular country means that a major fraction of the electorate has been "irretrievably" lost to the Communist cause.

This concept is also obviously erroneous from several standpoints.

In the first place, very often, large Communist votes, as in France and Italy, represent not so much pro-Communist votes, as antigovernment votes. They are ballots cast largely out of a traditional sense of protest against almost any incumbent government.

Since a vote for communism represents the most extreme form of protest, many people vote the Communist ticket for that purpose, although they are not actually Communists in their thinking. They may, in particular, admire the usual Communist aggressiveness in pushing for some immediate objective, e. g., higher wages, while actually disapproving long-range Communist goals.

In the second place, Communists have often proven their ability to bring out large votes by tactics of terror and coercion. Thus, a sizable Communist Party vote in a particular city or province may constitute a tribute not so much to mass devotion to Communist cause, but rather to the effectiveness of Communist goon squads in terrorizing the opposition.

TIMETABLE DIFFERS IN VARIOUS LANDS

In guarding against the fallacy of numbers, it should be remembered that the master planners of the worldwide Communist movement in Moscow plan different objectives for different countries and regions at particular times.

While ultimately the global objective is the same—the attainment of absolute power—yet in a given period, in a given place, the tactics and objectives may vary widely.

In one land, the Communists may be instructed to conduct a united front operation in which the Communist Party seems to take a back seat.

In another country, because the stage of the Communist timetable is different, the Communists may be ordered into the open to conduct violent street warfare, preparatory toward actually overthrowing a particular regime.

In still another land, where Communist resources are completely negligible, the party may not seem to exist at all, but may be engaged in a relatively quiet, long-range operation of indoctrination.

A basic distinction, moreover, to be borne in mind is that in accordance with the principles of Lenin, in every country there was ordered to be both a legal and illegal Red apparatus.

Everywhere the illegal operation represents for the Kremlin the highest priority. The effectiveness of the underground is the ultimate index of Communist success in that country. Thus, the limited electoral attainments of the Communist Party in Great Britain can hardly compare to the shocking accomplishment of the Communists in securing the defection of such key atomic scientists as Drs. Klaus Fuchs and Bruno Pontecorvo and of diplomats Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean.

The first named two individuals have undoubtedly changed the historical pattern of events in this century.

And so, in reviewing Communist activity, country by country, and region by region, it must be remembered that each Communist unit is but a pawn on the world chessboard for the Kremlin's conspirators.

A particular move on any one part of that chessboard becomes meaningful only in terms of analysis:

- (a) Of individual conditions in that area, and—
- (b) Overall operations of the Communist conspiracy throughout the world.

EXPOSING COMMUNIST CONTRADICTIONS

5. Another pattern which emerges in reviewing this report is the cunning Communist misuse of nationalism and other emotional themes in order to attain their objectives.

It is especially ironic that a movement so completely subservient to dictation from outside the borders of every land (except the Soviet Union) should achieve such incredible success in its false parading under the nationalist banner.

The Communist assertion of its devotion to nationalism is but one of the endless series of inherent lies on which communism is based.

Some people may think that communism will "automatically choke" of its own contradictions. But a more careful analysis shows that only the most relentless exposure of those contradictions can undermine the Communist movement.

Thus, anti-Communist forces throughout the world must endlessly document the fundamental contradictions of the Communists in all such instances as,

(a) Their striving for a philosophy of unmitigated atheism in countries deeply devoted to God.

(b) Their agitating for support by peasants of a philosophy which actually will give the peasants neither their own land nor their own bread, and—

(c) Their playing on war weariness and pacificism on behalf of a philosophy addicted to perpetual violence.

These and other lies and contradictions must be exposed again and again to the people. This must be accomplished in ways and with techniques that are as simple, as meaningful, and as memorable as the Communists themselves have proven so adept at using.

COMMUNISM'S ADAPTABILITY TO VARYING SITUATIONS

Another and justified basic impression from the report is communism's apparent universal adaptability.

Like a "snake oil" which is claimed to cure any ailment, depending on the malady of the particular listener, communism is represented in such a way that it may be all things to all men.

Communism has proven its ability to attract an intellectual, teaching in a great university of a metropolis, as well as an illiterate peasant, halfway around the world, engaging in brutal jungle warfare.

Communism has proven its ability cunningly to construct diverse appeals to virtually every group in society, to countries at all levels of social, political, economic, and industrial organization, to peoples of every creed, every race, and every color.

COMMUNISTS NO SUPERGROUP

Lest any individual, however, fall victim of any foolish belief as to the "invincibility" of the Communist cause, let it be pointed out that in country after country, communism has severely blundered again and again.

It has repeatedly misjudged the intelligence, courage, and love of freedom of its own slave and satellite peoples and of foreign peoples. Its slogans have often backfired; its record has risen to plague it. It has allowed historic opportunities to slip from its grasp.

In addition to setbacks which it has experienced because of its own mistakes, it has been hard hit by enlightened action against it conducted by free peoples, both individually and collectively.

Thus far, moreover, communism reveals an intrinsic weakness in that it is not able to control countries that are not contiguous to other Communist countries.

Like all totalitarian philosophies, the facade of Communist strength invariably hides a structure ridden with decay and split with a variety of bitter tensions and hatreds.

The Communist Party, while supposedly monolithic, even in lands which it does not control, has suffered on occasion from "heretical" splinter movements. Basically, it has fallen victim in all lands to the chronic ill to which all totalitarian movements are heir—endless battles for personal power.

All this however offers no cause for complacency on our part. It does offer good and sufficient reason for redoubling our efforts in conjunction with other peoples to defend our freedoms.

COMMUNISM WILL NOT DEFEAT ITSELF

In any event, let it never be forgotten that communism will not defeat itself.

Virtually no single country taken over by communism has in this century freed itself from Communist clutches.

Communism, once enthroned, brings to bear all of the immense powers of a police state to preserve itself. Its possession of the lightning techniques of modern communication and transportation makes armed insurrection exceedingly improbable, except through defections in the armed forces.

That even the lack of weapons cannot, however, deter the heart of oppressed people is the clear significance of recent news from within the Iron Curtain.

To what extent however the boiling ferment in the satellite area may weaken the worldwide Communist apparatus, if at all, remains to be seen.

As for ourselves, we can only continue to rely upon our steadfast vigilance if we would, with assurance, maintain the citadel of our liberty.

It is with the hope that this summary may constitute a helpful guidepost in the analysis and combating of the Communist movement that it is presented. The study was compiled under the supervision of Julius N. Cahn, committee counsel.

ALEXANDER WILEY.

October 1953.

SECTION 1

THE HISTORIC EXPANSION OF RUSSIA

Prepared by Library of Congress

As to the origin of the Slavs there are few fixed data until some centuries after the Christian era. They appear from the start as cultivators and more or less peaceful; they settled and multiplied. The area generally held was a middle country between the Lithuanians (in the basin of the Niemen) and the Carpathian Mountains, including particularly the upper portions of the rivers Vistula, Pripet, Dnieper, Dvina, Dniester and Southern Bug. They were long flanked on the north and northeast by Finns and on the southeast, at least at an early date, by nomadic peoples akin to the Persians.

Goths from the Baltic invaded from the north, descending the river routes to the Black Sea as early as the Second Century A. D. But a much greater invasion came from Asia in the latter half of the 4th century—the Huns conquered the Ostrogoths or East Goths and eventually swept much farther into Europe, incorporating apparently a large number of Slavs in the Hunnish Empire. With the break-up of that Empire following the death of Attila in 453 A. D., the Slavs are first seen as a unit, holding the river basins mentioned above, but somewhat spread out in every direction.

In the four centuries before 800 A. D. Slav tribes penetrated farther east, into the basin of the Don, but in particular increased their hold in the western portion of the wooded steppe lands. Vast regions, left essentially empty by the irruption of the Goths and other Teutons into the Roman Empire, were taken by Slavs who settled westward even beyond the Elbe and southward to the Adriatic, becoming later the West Slavs and the South Slavs. The East Slavs in their southeastern expansion beyond Kiev were limited by, and paid tribute, to the Khazars, a trading people of Turkish origin with their capital at the mouth of the Volga.


The Scandinavian Vikings or Varangers (warrior-traders) came after 830 and some were employed by Slav cities as defenders against new invasions from the northeast (Magyar and Pechenegs). Thus Rurik and his followers, invited about 862 to return for defensive purposes, became a ruling group which by the tenth century (Prince Oleg 880–912) wrought the East Slavs into a loose federation of Russian principalities which centered on the water road of the Dnieper and extended from Novgorod to Kiev.


Four expeditions from Kiev toward Constantinople (in 865, 907, 941, 944 A. D.), resulted mostly in trade treaties. Economic and cultural contact with the Greek Empire increased.

Svyatoslav in 965 defeated the Khazars and proceeded to establish a Russian state in place of the Khazar Empire. Then, as an early example of the historically often repeated alternate east-west thrusts he invaded and thoroughly defeated the Bulgarians in 968 and conquered the country. The Pechenegs (or Patsinaks) invaded from the

TERRITORIAL GROWTH OF THE SOVIET UNION

1261 TO 1954





Map drawn by Robert L. Bostick, Legislative Reference Service, The Library of Congress, September 1951.
 Source: George Goodall, *Soviet Russia in Maps*, 1943, and other data supplied by the Division of Maps, the Library of Congress.

* From Finland: Petsamo, Karelian Isthmus, western shore of Lake Ladoga, and a boundary correction of the Finnish "waist" (17,600 sq. miles).
 The Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (65,200 sq. miles)
 From Poland: 69,900 square miles— established the Curzon Line of 1920.
 From Romania: Bukovina and Bessarabia (19,400 sq. miles)
 From Germany: Königsberg area of East Prussia (5,400 sq. miles)
 From Czechoslovakia: Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) (4,900 sq. miles)
 1951— Total area of the U.S.S.R., 8,591,700 square miles; total population, 200,000,000 (est.)

East. He later lost "Bulgaria," reconquered it, entered Thrace, took Philippopolis but then was forced back (971).

Yaroslav about 1036 fought with the Poles (conquered back Galicia) and fought the Greeks.

Vladimir Monomakh (in the period 1101-1111) united all princes in victorious crusades against the heathen Cumans or Polovtsy (Kipchak Turks) who by the usual invasion route of the steppe area had replaced the Pechenegs of the Lower Dnieper. Thereafter followed a long period of princely struggle and frontier expansion, particularly in the Great Russian (Moscow) area.

The Tartar invasion, which began at the river Kalka in 1228 was resumed in 1237; Kiev fell in 1240. The Khanate of the Golden Hoard thereafter acted as suzerain of all Russia, levying tribute and taking military contingents but otherwise the princes were largely left in control under a system of protection based on submission and conciliation. Dmitry Donskoi defeated the Tartars at Kulikovo in 1380 but intermittent invasion continued until about 1480—the new Russia of the middle Volga was temporarily crushed and essentially long removed from the European orbit.

Meanwhile, about 1236 Swedish forces were defeated, as were the Teutonic Knights in 1242. The merchant city of Novgorod remained comparatively strong and independent. Galicia was particularly resistant during this period but following the early Tartar raids, much of the western area came under Lithuania by marriage and invasion (Kiev fell to the Lithuanians under Gedimin in 1321). Galicia passed to the Poles by marriage and by 1386 the Russians of the water road were under Polish rule.

Moscow, rather centrally located, was first mentioned as a settlement in 1147 and was walled in 1156. Population increased as a result of accepting refugees of Tartar raids on the Volga area and Tver, as well as by ransoming prisoners from the Tartars. By purchase, robbery or peaceful absorption the whole of the Moskva river area was possessed, then the basin of the Klyazma, the Middle Volga and the Oka to form a central block of territory. Basil I (1389-1425) completed the river domains by annexing Nizhny-Novgorod on the Volga and possibly some of the borderlands of Lithuania. Basil II annexed Mozhaïsk, Serpukhov and in some degree Ryazan, thus consolidating by 1452 a domain of some 15,000 sq. miles.

John III (Ivan III, The Great, 1462-1505) continued the consolidation. Novgorod, depending on control of the Middle Volga, had achieved an empire extending to the Ural Mountains. This was absorbed and in some areas colonized under church leadership by Moscow in stages between 1465 and 1488. Thus the vast region of Perm near the Urals was included (1472) as were Vyatka and Tver in 1485. Portions of Yaroslavl and Ryazan as well as Vereia were annexed. After 1490 annexations were made primarily on the southwest at the expense of Lithuania. A war with Sweden in 1496 was not productive. Two wars were waged with Poland and the mission was conceived to be that of reuniting all Russian Territory. John III took the title of Sovereign of all Russia as well as Tsar (Caesar) and Russia became in fact and in principle an autocracy. There was further expansion, particularly to the west (Pskov, 1510; Smolensk, 1514; and Ryazan, 1517). By the end of the reign of Basil III (1505-33) the Russian state was as good as made—there was now one un-

disputed authority from Chernigov to the Gulf of Finland, from the White Sea to the Urals.

In the period of John IV (or Ivan IV—The Terrible, 1533–82) futile wars were waged with Lithuania, Poland and Sweden and the first great Russian attempt to break through to the Baltic failed. In 1552, while Crimean Tartars invaded, John led a major expedition against Kazan—captured it at the junction of the Rivers Kama and Volga. This, in some degree broke Tartar domination, though for some years they continued to ravage Moscow's territory, even burning the Capital in 1571. Moscow now extended to the Urals and the Russians thereafter had a comparatively straight and easy road for advancement eastward. By 1582 Moscow had gained a firm foothold east of the Urals in Siberia, partly by activities of the merchant family Stroganov and partly by conquest of the Cossack Ermak in the Ovi and Irtysh river areas.

Astrakhan was annexed without difficulty in 1566 and Muscovy extended to the Caspian. A large section of the Cossacks of South Russia transferred their allegiance from the Polish-Lithuanian state to Moscow.

During a period of Civil War (1608–1612) the Swedes occupied Novgorod and the Poles advanced to Moscow but were driven out. Treaties which followed left Smolensk to the Poles and towns on the Gulf of Finland to the Swedes.

By 1637 Russian pioneers, mainly fur traders, had advanced over the whole of Siberia to the Pacific but after conflict with China in the Amur region were obliged to withdraw by the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689).

War with Poland (1654–67) for the Ukraine resulted in Russia obtaining the Smolensk region and the eastern Ukraine with Kiev, bringing the Russian Empire of approximately 9,000,000 population in contact with the Turks in the Balkans.

The first of many wars with the Ottoman Turks (1676–1682) resulted in most of Turkish Ukraine going to Russia. Azov, commanding the entrance to the Black Sea, was captured by Russia in 1696—and ceded by treaty in 1700. Russia was forced to return Azov to the Turks in 1711 but recaptured it in 1736–39, only to be forced by treaty to raze the fortifications and agree not to build a fleet on the Black Sea.

In 1768–72 Russia won unprecedented victories over the Turks; these were followed by insurrection of Cossacks in southeastern Russia. By the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji (1774) Russia acquired portions of the Crimea and the right of free navigation for commercial ships in Turkish waters. The Tartars of Crimea were recognized as "independent" and Russia was given rights of intervention in Moldavia and Walachia in behalf of the orthodox Christians. The Crimea was annexed by Russia in 1783 on the plea of restoring order. In 1787–92 Catherine engaged in another war against the Turks, with indecisive results though the Russians at one time had advanced as far as the Danube. Russia obtained Ochakov and a boundary along the Dniester River but gave up Moldavia and Bessarabia.

Early defeat at Narva but later decisive victory for Russia, particularly at Poltava, in the Great Northern War with Sweden (1700–1721) not only broke the power of Charles XII but marked the emergence of Russia in the place of Sweden as the dominant power in the Baltic. Russia thereby acquired Livonia, Estonia, Ingermanland,

part of Carelia and a number of Baltic islands—this a “*window*” on the Baltic and a definite place as a European power. After another war (1741–43), Sweden ceded Russia additional territory in Finland. War with Sweden occurred again in Finland in 1788–90 but left territory unchanged.

In 1733–35 (War of the Polish Succession) the Russians were able to establish a firm basis for control over internally weak Poland and prepare for the later partitions. In 1766–68 a favorite of Catherine II (The Great) was placed on the throne of Poland and the first partition of Poland followed in 1772; Russia acquired White Russia and all territory to the Dvina and Dnieper (with about 1,800,000 inhabitants, mostly Greek Orthodox). By the second partition, in 1793, Russia took most of Lithuania and most of Western Ukraine including Podolia, in all about 3,000,000 inhabitants. By treaty of alliance, Russia was given free entry for her troops in Poland and the right to control Poland's relations with other powers. By the third partition (1795), Russia took what remained of Lithuania and the Ukraine (some 1,200,000 inhabitants). Courland, long under Russian influence, was incorporated with Russia.

The 19th Century was a very busy one for the expanding Russians, who numbered about 36,000,000 persons at its beginning. Napoleon and Alexander I became allies after Russia's defeat in the War of the Third Coalition (1805–07). The Ionian Isles were occupied by Russia until 1807. But Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812; the battle at Borodino followed and Moscow was burned. Napoleon met disaster. Russia, by the Treaty of Vienna (1815), acquired most of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which was at first organized as the kingdom of Poland, permanently united with the Russian Empire. The Poles later revolted without success in 1830–31 and again in 1863–64.

By a new war with Sweden (1808–09), Finland was acquired and organized as an autonomous grand duchy under the Russian Tsar—constitutional government was guaranteed.

War with Turkey (1806–12) was followed by the Treaty of Bucharest which gave Bessarabia to Russia, as well as rather extensive rights in the Danubian principalities. This was followed by another war (1828–29) growing out of the Greek Revolution and conflict over the terms of the above treaty. Russia secured the mouth of the Danube and the eastern coast of the Black Sea. However, by the Treaty of Paris, following the Crimean War (1853–56) Russia lost control of the mouth of the Danube, ceded the southern part of Bessarabia to Turkey, agreed to build no fortifications and to keep no navy on the Black Sea, which was thereby neutralized. The Russian government took advantage of the Franco-German War (1870–71) to unilaterally abrogate the sea clauses of the above treaty. The Russians again obtained Bessarabia as well as Kars and Batum following the Russian-Turkish War of 1875–78.

After 1801 East Georgia was acquired. This aroused Persia and war (1804–13) resulted in recognition of the East Georgia annexation and the ceding to Russia of Daghestan and Shemakha. War again resulted (1826–28) partly from conquests in Transcaucasia. By the Treaty of Turkmanchai, Russia secured part of Armenia, Persia recognized Russia's exclusive right to have a navy on the Caspian Sea,

and granted important commercial concessions. The Russian conquest of the Caucasus area was not completed until 1859-64.

Expansion during the 19th Century proceeded also in the East. Far Eastern Russian pioneers came to Alaska in the late 1700's and Russian forts were built in Alaska and even in Northern California (1805-12). The California settlements were abandoned in 1844 and Alaska was sold to the United States in 1867, thus effectively removing the previous possibility that Russia might become the major power in the Pacific.

At about that time some of the difficulties with China were resolved. By the Treaty of Aigun, Russia acquired from China (1858) the left bank of the Amur River, and became established in the Maritime provinces by cession of the Ussuri region. Vladivostok was established in 1860. The Kurile Islands were ceded by treaty to Japan (1875) in exchange for Japanese claims to Sakhalin.

Conquest of Central Asia continued, including the Khanates of Kokand, Bokhara and Khiva, followed by annexation of the entire Trans-Caspian region in 1881. This resulted in friction with England because of nearness to India. Merv was taken in 1884 and a clash with Afghan troops in 1885 nearly brought war with England but resulted eventually in agreement on the Russian-Afghan frontier.

With the 20th Century events first came to a head in the Far East. The Russian-Japanese War (1904-05) resulted in the Treaty of Portsmouth whereby Russia ceded to Japan the southern part of Sakhalin, recognized Japan's predominant interests in Korea and transferred her lease of the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan.

The Balkan Wars (1912-13) were not participated in directly by Russia but World War I brought direct involvement, followed by governmental breakdown. The Provisional Government early in 1917 recognized the independence of Finland and Poland and granted Estonia autonomy. By the separate Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918) with the Germans, Russia was to give up Poland, the Ukraine and all borderlands occupied by non-Russians. Several independent governments were set up on the borders. Widespread civil war followed with intervention by the Allies in several sectors. The Ukraine was regained in 1919 but the Poles overran Kiev in the Soviet-Polish War (1920). The Japanese who had landed at Vladivostok late in 1917 did not evacuate until October 1922, whereupon it was re-annexed to Soviet Russia in November 1922. In summary, the U. S. S. R. of the post World War I period was reduced from the something like 8,660,000 square miles of the prewar empire of the Tsars to 8,336,864 square miles¹ by the formation of the separate countries Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Finland, by cession of Kars to Turkey and the loss of Bessarabia to Rumania.

The World War II period brought the Soviet occupation of East Poland (September 1939) followed by its incorporation in the U. S. S. R. The separate Soviet-Finnish War of December 1939 to March 1940 resulted in territorial and other gains for the U. S. S. R.


In June and July 1940 the U. S. S. R. incorporated Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia and North Bukovina after having, by Treaty, secured bases in the first three in September and October 1939. June 22, 1941, German armies invaded, advancing eventually far into the U. S. S. R.—almost to a line from Leningrad to Moscow

¹Another estimate was only 8,189,374 square miles.

to Stalingrad to the Mid-Caucasus, but were later thrown back. Developments at the War's end and later gave the U. S. S. R. the Koenigsberg area of East Prussia and the Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) section of Czechoslovakia as well as effective control of much of Eastern and Central Europe.

The Soviet declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945. Under the formal terms of Japanese surrender (accepted August 14, 1945), Outer Mongolia was recognized as part of the Soviet sphere of control. Tanna Tuva became Russian in 1946. Russia shared with China the facilities and supervision of Port Arthur and the Manchurian railroads. Sakhalin and the Kuriles became Russian, as did de facto control of Korea north of 38° N.

Thus the U. S. S. R., not counting the controlled border countries, became a compact but enormous political unit of some 8,414,000 square miles and more than 200,000,000 persons.



SECTION 2

THE NATURE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES

Excerpts from Communist sources

The following quotations have been selected from various Communist sources to show the nature of Communist parties, particularly those operating in countries with non-Communist governments.

The quotations highlight the contempt which Communists have for parliamentary institutions and the cynical manner in which Communists participate in parliaments for the sole purpose of wrecking them. The quotations also confirm that Communists must of necessity oppose reform movements and they emphasize over and over the complete loyalty which a Communist must have for his party.

The Communists themselves make clear in these statements that they are prepared to operate within or without the law, to change direction or tactics as expediency dictates, without changing their basic strategy or ultimate objective.

Above all, the quotations demonstrate the impossibility of carrying on normal democratic political life with Communist participation.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS—REQUIREMENTS ON ALL COMMUNIST PARTIES

"* * * (T)he Second World Congress finds it necessary to establish most definite conditions for the joining of new parties, as well as to point out to such parties as have already joined the Communist International the duties which are laid upon them.

"The Second Congress of the Communist International rules that the conditions for joining the Communist International shall be as follows:

"1. The general propaganda and agitation should bear a really Communist character, and should correspond to the program and decisions of the Third International. The entire party press should be edited by reliable Communists who have proved their loyalty to the cause of the proletarian revolution. * * *

* * * * *

"Wherever the followers of the Third International have access, and whatever means of propaganda are at their disposal, whether the columns of newspapers, popular meetings, labor unions or co-operatives,—it is indispensable for them not only to denounce the bourgeoisie, but also its assistants and agents—reformists of every color and shade.

* * * * *

"The class struggle in almost every country of Europe and America is entering the phase of civil war. Under such conditions the Communists can have no confidence in bourgeois laws. They should create everywhere a parallel illegal apparatus, which at the decisive

moment should be of assistance to the party to do its duty toward the revolution. In every country where, in consequence of martial law or of other exceptional laws, the Communists are unable to carry on their work legally, a combination of legal and illegal work is absolutely necessary.

"Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be carried on in the army, where Communist groups should be formed in every military organization. Wherever owing to repressive legislation agitation becomes impossible, it is necessary to carry on such agitation illegally. But refusal to carry on or participate in such work should be considered equal to treason to the revolutionary cause, and incompatible with affiliation to the Third International.

"A systematic and regular propaganda is necessary in the rural districts. The working class can gain no victory unless it possesses the sympathy and support of at least part of the rural workers and of the poor peasants, and unless other sections of the population are equally utilized. Communists work in the rural districts in acquiring a predominant importance during the present period. It should be carried on through Communist workmen of both city and country who have connections with the rural districts. To refuse to do this work, or to transfer such work to untrustworthy half reformists, is equal to renouncing the proletarian revolution.

"Every party desirous of affiliating to the Third International should renounce not only avowed social patriotism, but also the falsehood and the hypocrisy of social pacifism: It should systematically demonstrate to the workers that without a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism no international arbitration, no talk of disarmament, no democratic reorganization of the League of Nations will be capable of saving mankind from new imperialist wars.

"Parties desirous of joining the Communist International must recognize the necessity of a complete and absolute rupture with reformism and the policy of the centralists, and must advocate this rupture amongst the widest circles of the party membership, without which condition a consistent Communist policy is impossible. The Communist International demands unconditionally and peremptorily that such rupture be brought about with the least possible delay. * * *

* * * Every party desirous of belonging to the Third International should be bound to denounce without any reserve all the methods of 'its own' imperialists in the colonies, supporting not in words only but practically a movement of liberation in the colonies. * * *

* * * Every party desirous of belonging to the Communist International should be bound to carry on systematic and persistent Communist work in the labor unions, co-operatives and other organizations of working masses. * * *

* * * At the present time of acute civil war the Communist Party will only be able fully to do its duty when it is organized in a sufficiently centralized manner; when it possesses an iron discipline and when its party center enjoys the confidence of the party membership and is endowed with complete power, authority and ample rights."

"The Communist parties of those countries where the Communist activity is legal should clean out their members from time to time, as

well as those of the party organizations, in order to systematically free the party from the petty bourgeois elements which penetrate into it.

"Each party desirous of affiliating to the Communist International, should be obliged to render every possible assistance to the Soviet Republics in their struggle against all counter-revolutionary forces. The Communist parties should carry on a precise and definite propaganda to induce the workers to refuse to transport any kind of military equipment intended for fighting against the Soviet Republics, and should also by legal or illegal means carry on a propaganda amongst the troops sent against the workers' republics, etc.

* * * * *

"All the resolutions of the congresses of the Communist International, as well as the resolutions of the Executive Committee are binding for all parties joining the Communist International. The Communist International, operating under the conditions of most acute civil warfare, should be centralized in a better manner than the Second International. * * *

* * * * *

"All the leading organs of the press of every party are bound to publish all the most important documents of the Executive Committee of the Communist International."—"Conditions of Admission to the Communist International," as adopted at the Second World Congress, 1920, at Moscow, Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party, 1921, reprinted in "Blueprint For World Conquest," Human Events Publishers, Washington 1946, pp. 65-72.

AIMS OF COMMUNIST PARTIES

1. DESTRUCTION OF BOURGEOIS PARLIAMENTS

"Parliamentarism cannot be a form of proletarian government during the transition period between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and that of the proletariat. At the moment when the intensified class struggle turns into civil war the proletariat must inevitably form its State organization as a fighting organization, which cannot admit any of the representatives of the former ruling classes; all fictions of a 'national will' are harmful to the proletariat at this period, and a parliamentary division of authority is needless and injurious to it; the only form of proletarian dictatorship is a Republic of Soviets.

"The bourgeois parliaments, which constitute one of the most important apparatus of the State machinery of the bourgeoisie, cannot be taken over by the proletariat any more than can the bourgeois order in general. The task of the proletariat consists in blowing up the whole machinery of the bourgeoisie, in destroying it, and all the parliamentary institutions with it, whether they be republican or constitutional-monarchy.

* * * * *

"Consequently, Communism repudiates parliamentarism as the form of the future; it renounces the same as a form of the class dictatorship of the proletariat; it repudiates the possibility of winning over the parliaments; its aim is to destroy parliamentarism. Therefore it is only possible to speak of utilizing the bourgeois State

organizations with the object of destroying them. The question can only and exclusively be discussed on such a plane.

* * * * *

"The fundamental means of the struggle of the proletariat against the rule of the bourgeoisie, that is, its state power, is, first of all, the method of mass demonstrations. Such mass demonstrations are prepared and carried out by the mass organizations of the proletariat, under the direction of a united, disciplined, centralized Communist Party. Civil war is war. In this war the proletariat must have its efficient political officers, its good political general staff, to conduct operations during all the stages of that fight.

"The mass struggle means a whole system of developing activities growing ever more acute in form and logically leading to an uprising against the capitalist state. In this warfare of the masses developing into civil war, the guiding party of the proletariat must, as a general rule, secure every and all legal positions making them its auxiliaries in the revolutionary work, and subordinating such positions to the plans of the general campaign, that of the mass struggle.

"One of such auxiliary supports is the rostrum of the bourgeois parliament. Against participation in a political campaign one should not use the argument that parliament is a bourgeois government institution. The Communist Party enters such institutions not for the purpose of organization work, but in order to direct the masses to blow up the whole bourgeois machinery and the parliament itself from within. * * *

"This work within the parliaments, which consists chiefly in making revolutionary propaganda from the parliamentary platform, the denouncing of enemies, the ideological unification of the masses, who are still looking up to the parliamentary platform, captivated by democratic illusions, especially in backward territories, etc., must be fully subordinated to the objects and tasks of the mass struggle outside the parliaments.

"The participation in the election campaign and the revolutionary propaganda from the parliamentary tribune has a special importance for the winning over of those strata of the workers, who—as perhaps the agrarian working masses—have stood far away from the revolutionary movement and the political life.

* * * * *

"The election campaign must be carried on not for the purpose of obtaining a large number of seats in parliament, but for the revolutionary mobilization of the masses around the slogans of the proletarian revolution. * * *

"* * * (A)n acknowledgement of the value of parliamentary work in no wise leads to an absolute, in-all-and-any-case acknowledgement of the necessity of concrete elections and a concrete participation in parliamentary sessions. The matter depends upon a series of specific conditions. Under certain circumstances it may become necessary to leave the parliament. The Bolsheviks did so when they left the Pre-parliament in order to break it up, to weaken it, and to set up against it the Petrograd Soviet, which was then prepared to head the uprising; they acted in the same way in the Constituent Assembly on the day of its dissolution, converting the Third Congress of Soviets into the centre of political events. In other circumstances a boy-

cotting of the elections may be necessary, and a direct violent storming of both the great bourgeois state apparatus and the parliamentary bourgeois clique, or a participation in the elections with a boycott of the parliament itself, etc.

"In this way, while recognizing as a general rule the necessity of participating in the elections to the central parliament, and the institutions of local self-government, as well as in the work in such institutions, the Communist Party must decide the question concretely, according to the specific conditions of the given moment. Boycotting the elections or the parliament, or leaving the parliament, is permissible, chiefly when there is a possibility for an immediate transition to an armed fight for power.

"At the same time one must constantly bear in mind the relative unimportance of this question. If the center of gravity lies in a struggle for the power outside the parliament, then naturally the question of a proletarian dictatorship and a mass fight for it is immeasurably greater than the secondary one of using the parliament.

"Therefore the Communist International insists categorically that it considers any division or attempt at a division within the Communist parties, because of differences on this question, as a crime against the labor movement. The Congress calls upon all the elements which are in favor of the mass struggle for the proletarian dictatorship, under the direction of a centralized party of the revolutionary proletariat exercising its influence over all the mass organizations of the working-class—to strive for a complete unity between the Communist elements, notwithstanding any possible disagreement on the question of utilizing the bourgeois parliaments.

"A Communist representative, by decision of the Central Committee, is bound to combine legal work with illegal work. In countries where the Communist delegate enjoys a certain inviolability, this must be utilized by way of rendering assistance to the illegal organizations and for the propaganda of the party.

"The Communist representatives shall make all their parliamentary work dependent on the work of the party outside the parliament.

* * *

"Each Communist representative must remember that he is not a 'legislator,' who is bound to seek agreements with the other legislators, but an agitator of the party detailed into the enemy's camp in order to carry out the orders of the party there. The Communist member is answerable not to the wide mass of his constituents, but to his own Communist party—whether legal or illegal."—*Theses adopted at Second Congress of Communist International (1920)* (Reprinted from *Theses and Statutes of Communist International*, New York Central Committee of Communist Party of America, 1921). "*Blueprint for World Conquest*" (Human Events Publishers, Washington, 1946) pp. 89-95.

2. MISSION OF COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

"The Communist International is the concentrated will of the world revolutionary proletariat. Its mission is to organize the working class of the whole world for the overthrow of the capitalist order and the establishment of Communism."—"National and Colonial Question" *Theses and Statutes of II Congress of Communist*

International (1920) (Central Executive Committee of Communist Party of America, New York, 1921) reprinted in "*Blueprint for World Conquest*" (Human Events Press, New York, 1946) p. 128.

3. CONQUEST OF POWER

"* * * The conquest of power by the proletariat does not mean peacefully 'capturing' the ready-made bourgeois State machinery by means of a parliamentary majority. The bourgeoisie resorts to every means of violence and terror to safeguard and strengthen its predatory property and its political domination. Like the feudal nobility of the past the bourgeoisie cannot abandon its historical position to the new class without a desperate and frantic struggle. Hence, the violence of the bourgeoisie can be suppressed only by the stern violence of the proletariat. The conquest of power by the proletariat is the violent overthrow of bourgeoisie power, the destruction of the capitalist State apparatus (bourgeoisie armies, police, bureaucratic hierarchy, the judiciary, parliaments, etc.), and the substitution in its place of new organs of proletarian power, to serve primarily as instruments for the suppression of the exploiters."—*Program of Communist International*, Section 4, Part 1, Adopted at VI Congress in Moscow, (September 1, 1928) Contained in *Handbook of Marxism* (International Publishers, New York, 1935), p. 991.

4. SUBVERSION INSIDE PARLIAMENT

"As long as you are unable to disperse the bourgeois parliament and every other type of reactionary institution, you *must* work inside them, precisely because in them there are still workers who are stupefied by the priests and by the dreariness of village life; otherwise you run the risk of becoming mere babblers."—Lenin—"Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder" (1920) *Selected Works*, (International Publishers, New York, 1943) vol. X, p. 100."

5. UNITY OF COMMUNIST FORCES

"The principle task of the Communist Parties at present is to unite the scattered Communist forces, to form in every country a united Communist Party (or to reinforce or revive already existing Parties) in order to increase tenfold the work of preparing the proletariat for the Conquest of political power, the conquest of power precisely in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat."—Lenin, "Theses on Fundamental Tasks of 2nd Congress of Communist International" (1920), *Selected Works*, (International Publishers, New York, 1943) vol. X, p. 167.

TACTICS OF COMMUNIST PARTIES

1. FAN REBELLION

"If we have a strongly organized party, a single strike may grow into a political demonstration, into a political victory over the government. If we have a strongly organized Party, a rebellion in a single locality may flare into a victorious revolution. We must bear in mind that the fight against the government for certain demands, the

gain of certain concessions, are merely slight skirmishes with the enemy, slight skirmishes of outposts, but that the decisive battle still lies ahead." -Lenin, "Urgent Tasks of Moment" (1900) *Selected Works* (International Publishers, New York, 1943), vol. II, p. 14.

2. LEGAL AND ILLEGAL OPERATIONS

"* * * The time has fully matured when it is absolutely necessary for every Communist party systematically to combine legal with illegal work * * * legal with illegal organization * * * it is necessary immediately for all legal Communist Parties to form illegal organizations for the purpose of systematically carrying on illegal work, and of fully preparing for the moment when the bourgeoisie resorts to persecution. Illegal work is particularly necessary in the army, the navy and police * * *. On the other hand it is also necessary in all cases without exception, not to restrict oneself to illegal work, but also to carry on legal work overcoming all obstacles that stand in the way of this, forming legal organs of the press and legal organizations under the most varied titles, which may often be changed in the event of necessity." -Lenin, "Theses on Fundamental Tasks of Second Congress" (1920) *Selected Works* (International Publishers, New York, 1943), vol. X, p. 172-173).

3. FORCE OVERRIDES PARLIAMENTARIANISM

"The Bolsheviks utilized parliamentary forms of struggle extensively, although they knew that the fate of classes and nations is not decided in the ballot boxes nor in the session of parliament. The Bolsheviks never ascribed decisive significance to the parliamentary forms of struggle; they viewed the parliamentary forms of struggle only as a supplementary means in the basic, extraparlimentary, revolutionary methods of struggle. Comrade Stalin wrote: 'Is it not true that the history of the revolutionary movement shows that the parliamentary struggle is only a school and an aid in the organization of the extraparlimentary struggle of the proletariat, that the basic questions of the workers' movements under capitalism are decided by force and by the direct action (general strikes and insurrection) of the proletarian masses?' (Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vol. VI, p. 84.) -*Bolshevik* "International Significance of Historical Experience of Bolshevik Party" Burdzhalov, No. 17, September 15, 1948.

4. ROLE OF PARTY IN COLONIAL COUNTRIES

"The task is to consolidate the advanced elements of the workers in colonial countries into a united Communist Party capable of taking a lead in the growing revolution. This is what Lenin said about the growing revolutionary movement in colonial countries as early as 1922: '* * * In these lands, 1905 is fast approaching, inexorably and with ever increasing speed, but with this essential and enormous difference--that in 1905 the revolution in Russia could (at the outset at any rate) proceed in isolation, that is to say, without immediately drawing other countries into the revolution; whereas the revolutions growing in India and China are already being drawn, and have been drawn, into the revolutionary struggle, into the revolutionary movement, into the international revolution.' " (*Collected Works*, Russian

edition, vol. XXVII, p. 293) Stalin, "Report to 14th Conference of Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)" (1925), *Leninism* (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers, Moscow, 1934), vol. I, p. 162.

5. PARTICIPATE IN, THEN DESTROY

"* * * participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament even a few weeks before the victory of a Soviet republic, and even *after* that victory, not only does no harm to the revolutionary proletariat, but actually makes it easier for it to *prove* to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispersed; it *facilitates* the success in dispersing them, and *facilitates* the process whereby bourgeois parliamentarianism becomes 'politically obsolete.'" Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder," (1920) *Selected Works* (International Publishers, New York, 1943), vol. X, p. 101.

ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP

1. BOLSHEVIZE THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

"* * * 'The next task,' said Comrade Stalin in 1924, 'is to make the Western Communist parties really Bolshevik, to develop in them genuine revolutionary cadres, capable of reorganizing all Party activity in the sense of revolutionary education of the masses, in the sense of actual preparation for the revolution' (Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vol. VI, p. 292) * * *. Bolshevizing the Communist parties meant reorganizing their activities on the basis of the Bolshevik Party's experience, which was derived from the revolution in Russia as well as in other parts of Europe. It was a matter of making these parties actually Communist and Bolshevik. * * * By adopting the remarkable experience of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) * * * and by building up their own experience, the Communist Parties attained great victories. They became mass workers' parties, developed their own revolutionary cadres and leaders, won over the broad masses, and, in a number of countries became a most important political force. The Communist Parties, by waging an untiring struggle against opportunism, achieved great success in Bolshevizing their ranks. Further study and assimilation of Bolshevik experience is necessary for consolidating the Communist Parties. No matter what special characteristics may exist in individual countries, the general principles of Bolshevism are mandatory for all countries. Forgetting or ignoring the historical experience of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) inevitably leads to grievous consequences."—"Bolshevik, 'International Significance of Historical Experience of Bolshevik Party,' Burdzhalov, No. 17, September 15, 1948."

2. CONTROL BY PARTY OF NEWSPAPERS

"The periodical and non-periodical press and all publishing enterprises must be entirely subordinated to the Central Committee of the Party irrespective of whether the party as a whole is legal or illegal at the given moment; publishing enterprises must not be permitted to abuse their autonomy by pursuing a policy that is not entirely the party policy."—Lenin, "Conditions of Affiliation to the Communist International" (1920) *Selected Works* (International Pub-

lishers, New York, 1943) vol. X, p. 204. (Statement of requirements a national Communist Party must meet before it could join the Comintern.)

3. SECRECY OF OPERATIONS

"It is impossible to tolerate that certain workers of the Party machinery should be careless with their papers and even lose them. A Party committee gathers information on the activity of many organizations. Therefore, every job in the machinery of the Party is of a secret nature."—*Partiinaya Zhizn* (Party Life) "Political Vigilance of Party Official" No. 19, October, 1947, p. 4.

4. AID TO OTHER PARTIES

"What would happen if the Communist Party of the US would appeal for aid to the Communist Party of the USSR? I think the Communist Party of the USSR would render whatever assistance it could. Indeed, what would be the worth of the Communist Party, a party that is in power, if it refused to do what it could to aid the Communist Party of another country laboring under the yoke of capitalism? I would say that such a Communist Party would not be worth a cent."—Stalin, "Interviews with American Labor Delegation," (September 9, 1927), *Leninism*, (Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers, Moscow, 1934) vol. I, p. 385. (Answer to US labor leaders inquiries as to the relationship between the US Communist Party and that in the USSR.)

5. REQUIREMENT OF ANTIRELIGION

"The Party cannot be neutral regarding religion, and it conducts anti-religious propaganda against all religious prejudices because it stands for science, and religious prejudices are opposed to science since any religion is contrary to science. * * * There are cases in which some of the members of the Party occasionally hinder the thorough development of anti-religious propaganda. If such members of the Party are expelled this is very good since there is not room in the ranks of the Party for such 'Communists'. (Stalin) * * *. It goes without saying that only that Komsomol can correctly clarify the harm in superstition and religious prejudices, who is free of them himself. A young man cannot be a Komsomol unless he is free of religious convictions."—*Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Young Communist Truth), the magazine—"Young Bolshevik" October 18, 1947, p. 2.

6. ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE

"For Communists there is nothing above the interests of the Party."—*Pravda*, "Talks on the Charter of the CPSU(b)" September 14, 1946, p. 2. (Discussion of duties of a Party member and his position in society.)

**(A) COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY TABULATION OF COMMUNIST
PARTY STRENGTH OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES**

SECTION 3

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Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status				Communist party membership	Source of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center	Conservative		
United Kingdom October 1951.	Communist Party: 21,640 votes (0.07 percent), no seats.	Labor Party: 13,949,105 votes (48.7 percent), 295 seats (47.2 percent).	Liberal Party: 730,552 votes (2.5 percent), 6 seats (0.9 percent). Independents: 177,329 votes (0.6 percent), 3 seats (0.5 percent).	Conservative Party and allies: 13,730,642 votes (48.0 percent) 321 seats (including 4 uncontested constituencies in Northern Ireland) (51.4 percent).	34,801 (claim, April 1953).	The Communist Party has a small membership. It has been excluded from Labor Party affiliation, has persistently failed to win local government elections, and has lost all representation in Parliament. Although Communists continue to exploit relatively important positions in such unions as the National Union of Mineworkers, Amalgamated Engineers, and National Union of Railwaymen as well as their positions as shop stewards in factories, their influence has been curtailed in individual unions by a sustained anti-Communist campaign on the part of the Trades Union Congress. Security precautions against Communist activities in important civil service posts, especially atomic research, have been increased. Since the exposure in 1946 of Soviet espionage in Canada, the Labor Progressive Party—Canada's Communist Party—has declined in national, provincial, and municipal elections. In 1945, 68 Communist candidates polled 112,195 votes; in 1949, 160 candidates polled 32,623 votes; and in 1953, 100 candidates polled just 61,831 votes. Canadian Communists are extremely active, however, among the foreign-language groups. They also have extensively organized "cultural" front organizations and continue to be active in a number of unions in the strategic electronics, shipbuilding, and mining-milling-smelting industries. The 3 chief Communist-dominated unions are the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelters Workers, and the International Fur and Leather Workers, all of which have been expelled from the Canadian Congress of Labor. The Maritime Shipbuilding Workers Federation on the Atlantic coast and the Vancouver Marine and Boilermakers Union on the Pacific coast are also Communist-led, but as yet have not been expelled from their respective national federations.
Canada: Auguts 1953.	Labor Progressive Party: 61,831 votes (1.1 percent), no seats.	Cooperative Commonwealth Federation: 630,107 votes (11.5 percent), 23 seats (5.7 percent).	Liberal Party: 2,645,778 votes (48.2 percent), 170 seats (64.1 percent). Independents: 117,624 votes (2.1 percent), 6 seats (2.3 percent).	Progressive Conservative Party: 1,722,498 votes (33.4 percent), 51 seats (19.2 percent). Social Credit Party: 312,439 votes (5.7 percent), 15 seats (5.7 percent).	10,000 (estimate)	

British Commonwealth—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status				Communist party membership	Source of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center	Conservative		
Australia, April 1951.	Communist Party: 45,759 votes (0.95 percent), no seats.	Labor Party: 2,162,379 votes (46.5 percent), 54 seats.	None.....	Liberal and Country Parties: 2,310,973 votes (49.6 percent), 69 seats (56 percent).	6,000 (estimate).	Communist influence is concentrated in the Australian labor union movement. Party members hold some key offices in transport, mining, and heavy-industry unions, but in the last 3 years anti-Communist groups within the unions have ousted most and limited the manipulative power of other Communist officials.
New Zealand, September 1951.	Communist Party: 476 votes (0.4 percent), no seats.	Labor Party: 448,017 votes (16.20 percent), 33 seats (41 percent).	None.....	National Party: 520,419 votes (53.62 percent), 47 seats (59 percent).	500 (estimate)---	The Communists have very little electoral strength. Moreover, in most unions Communist influence is now slight, and the Communists no longer dominate any national union.
Union of South Africa, April 1953.	Communist Party: No candidates entered since expulsion from Assembly of Cape natives' representative.	Labor Party: 31,730 votes (2.9 percent), 4 seats (2.6 percent).	United Party: 576,074 votes (47.5 percent), 57 seats (36 percent).	Nationalist Party: 598,297 votes (49.5 percent), 94 seats (59 percent).	1,000-2,000 (estimate).	The Communist Party is now an illegal organization and has declared itself dissolved. Members are active in native and colored labor unions, several small European labor unions, the Springbok Legion of Veterans, and Indian Congress and colored organizations. They were also active in the passive resistance campaign against discriminatory laws.

Northern Europe

Iceland, June 28, 1953.	Workingman's United Front—the Socialist Party: 12,122 votes (16.08 percent), 7 seats (13.4 percent).	Social Democratic Party: 12,093 votes (15.75 percent), 6 seats (11.5 percent). National Defense Party: 4,569 votes (6.04 percent), 2 seats (3.9 percent).	Progressive Party: 16,959 votes (21.63 percent), 16 seats (30.8 percent).	Conservative Party: 28,546 votes (37.22 percent), 21 seats (40.4 percent). Republican Party: 2,531 votes (3.28 percent), no seats.	950 (estimate)---	Although the Communists are still Iceland's third largest party by a handful of votes, they suffered their first loss in popular support in the June 1953 elections since the party was founded in 1930. Communist mandates went down from 9 in 1949 to 7 in 1953, and the party's popular vote dropped by 3.5 percent. Major causes of party successes have been its exploitation of isolationism, cultural nationalism, and close attention to the material demands of workers. Despite Communist electoral losses to the new and more radically nationalist National De-
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Denmark, Sept. 22,
1953.

Communist Party:
93,824 votes (4.3
percent), 8 seats
(4.8 percent).

Social Democratic
Party: 891,913 votes
(41.3 percent), 74
seats (42.3 percent).

Radical Liberal Par-
ty: 169,295 votes (7.8
percent), 14 seats
(8.0 percent).
German Party: 9,721
votes (0.5 percent),
1 seat (0.6 percent).

Moderate Liberal
Party: 493,656 votes
(23.1 percent), 42
seats (24 percent).
Justice Party: 75,449
votes (3.5 percent),
6 seats (3.4 percent).
Conservative Party:
364,960 votes (16.8
percent), 30 seats
(17.1 percent).
Independent Party:
58,573 votes (2.7 per-
cent), no seats.

16,000 (estimate)

fense Party, the Communist Party re-
mains strong in Reykjavik, Akureyri,
Siglufjordhur, and the Westmann Is-
lands. Communists remain in control of
approximately 1/3 of the total trade union
membership, including that of Iceland's
largest single union (Dagsbrun) in Re-
ykjavik, which is composed of unskilled
workers. Communist influence is also
strong among a significant minority of
the intellectuals.

Communist voting strength in 1953 re-
mained stabilized at roughly the level to
which it had declined in 1950. This elec-
toral hard core represents a loss in votes
since the postwar peak in 1945 of more
than 60 percent. Communist voting
strength is centered principally in the
larger cities with Copenhagen alone sup-
plying nearly 50 percent of the party's
total. By contrast, less than 2 percent is
drawn from the more rural areas. With-
in the larger cities, the trade unions re-
main the major strongholds of Commu-
nist support, with some following among
intellectuals and professional groups as
well. Although the Communists control
none of the 75 national trade unions in
Denmark, they do have varying degrees
of strength in a number of locals, princi-
pally in Copenhagen and the major pro-
vincial cities, and within these primarily
among the dockworkers, building trades,
metal, unskilled, and transportation
workers.

Northern Europe—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status				Communist party membership	Source of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center	Conservative		
Norway, Oct. 12, 1953. ¹	Communist Party: 89,963 votes (5.1 percent), 3 seats (2 percent).	Labor Party: 827,941 votes (46.7 percent), 77 seats (51.33 percent).	Liberal Party: 176,811 votes (10 percent), 15 seats (10 percent). Christian People's Party: 186,148 votes (10.5 percent), 14 seats (9.33 percent).	Conservative Party: 325,962 votes (18.4 percent), 27 seats (18 percent). Agrarian Party: 156,315 votes (8.8 percent), 14 seats (9.33 percent).	7,500 (estimate)	Communist voting strength has declined from 11.9 percent in 1945, the peak of Communist electoral support, to 5.1 percent in 1953. Party membership has also declined, dropping from around 40,000 at the end of the war to about 7,000 or 8,000 at the end of 1953. As the result of a revised electoral law in 1953, the Communists returned 3 representatives to the legislature for the first time since 1949, despite the loss of more than 12,000 votes. Communist voting strength is widely distributed throughout Norway. Major centers of numerical strength are the Oslo area, the province Hedmark, and North Norway. In the 3 northern provinces as well as in Møre og Romsdal the Communists registered gains. Of the 41 national unions making up the Norwegian Federation of Labor, Communists control only the weak Norwegian Tobacco Workers' Union with 1,300 members, which they captured in June 1953. Among the union locals, their most important areas of infiltration include the building trades—iron and metal workers, paper-industry workers, transport workers, wood-industry workers, and electric, and power-station workers.
Sweden, Dec. 14, 1952.	Communist Party: 164,194 votes (4.3 percent), 5 seats (2.2 percent).	Social Democratic Party: 1,742,284 votes (46 percent), 110 seats (47.9 percent).	Liberal Party: 924,819 votes (24.4 percent), 58 seats (25.2 percent). Agrarian Party: 406,183 votes (10.7 percent), 26 seats (11.3 percent).	Conservative Party: 543,625 votes (14.4 percent), 31 seats (13.5 percent).	30,000 (estimate)	The Communist Party of Sweden appears to have been reduced very nearly to its core of loyal followers. In the parliamentary elections held Sept. 21, 1952, the party lost 3 of its 8 seats in the lower house and declined to 4.4 percent of the total vote. Its electoral position is now comparable to that in 1940 when its prestige was also at a low ebb and it secured only 3.5 percent of the total vote. The strategically located iron mining region of Norrbotten in northern Sweden remains the center of highest Communist concentra-

Finland, July 2-3, 1951.	Democratic Union (SKDL): 391,362 votes (21.45 percent), 43 seats (21.5 percent).	Social Democrats: 480,754 votes (26.32 percent), 53 seats (26.5 percent).	Agrarians: 421,613 votes (23.18 percent), 51 seats (25.5 percent). Swedish People's: 137,171 votes (7.52 percent), 15 seats (7.5 percent).	Conservative Coalition: 264,044 votes (14.56 percent), 28 seats (14 percent). Finnish National Party: 102,933 votes (5.57 percent), 10 seats (5 percent).	30,000-50,000 (estimate, probably nearer 30,000). Over 50,000 (claim in November 1951).	tion with 17.3 percent of the vote cast going to the Communist Party in the 1952 election compared to 11.2 percent for Göteborg and 6.7 percent for Stockholm, the second and third most important Communist centers, respectively, in Sweden. Within these centers Communist support is concentrated in the trade-union locals, chiefly the metal, building, and transport, and iron-mine workers. Communists control no national unions. During 1953 the Social Democrats wrested control from the Communists of additional locals, the most important being the metal and shipyard workers in Gothenburg and the miners in the northern area of Kiruna, all traditional Communist strongholds. The membership of the Communist Party probably remained stationary during 1953 although the IX Congress of the Finnish Communist Party held in November 1951 called for an enlargement of the mass basis of the party. The Social Democrats retained control of the Central Federation of Trade Unions (SAK), maintaining their position among the rank and file and in some cases increasing their organizational strength. The Communists remained outside the cabinet. In the parliamentary election of July 1951 they made only slight gains.
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† Unofficial figures.

Eastern Europe

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status		Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist-controlled bloc	Non-Communist opposition		
Albania, May 28, 1950.	Democratic Front: 626,005 votes (98.18 percent), 121 seats (100 percent).	11,573 votes (1.82 percent), blank ballots.	44,418 regular and candidate members (official claim, March 1952).	The Albanian Workers' Party (Communist) dominates the Democratic Front, and through it controls the country. Its adherents hold the key posts in the youth, women's, professional and other organizations as well as the important offices in the Government. No other political party is tolerated.
Bulgaria, Dec. 20, 1953.	Fatherland Front: 4,981,594 votes (99.80 percent), 219 seats (100 percent).	9,077 "No" votes (0.18 percent), 967 invalid votes (0.02 percent).	Nearly 500,000 (official claim, Dec. 12, 1952).	The Fatherland Front is now the sole, all-embracing political organization replacing the 5 political parties of which it was originally formed. In addition to the Communist Party, the only other recognized political party is the pro-Government Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. Directly or through the Fatherland Front, the Communist Party, with which the Socialist Party was fused in 1948, dominates the entire life of the country.
Czechoslovakia, May 30, 1948.	Communist-sponsored Single List (Communists, Czech Socialists, People's Party, Social Democrats, Slovak Party of Regeneration, Slovak Freedom Party): 6,429,000 votes (89 percent), 300 seats (100 percent).	770,000 votes (10.7 percent), blank ballots.	1,677,433 (official claim, Feb. 9, 1951).	The Communist Party seized power in the coup of February 1948. It absorbed the Social Democrats in June 1948, and, while it continues to tolerate the Czech Socialist and People's Parties in revised form, as well as the Slovak Freedom Party and the Slovak Party of Regeneration, it has a monopoly on the entire machinery of control of the state.
Hungary, May 17, 1953.	Communist-sponsored Single List Independent People's Front (Hungarian Workers, Smallholders, National Peasants, Radical Democrats, Independent Democrats): 6,256,653 votes (96.2 percent), 298 seats (100 percent).	61,257 "No" votes (1 percent), 52,609 invalid votes (0.8 percent).	Nearly 1 million (official claim, 1953).	A political coup at the end of May 1947 placed the Communists in de facto control of the Hungarian Government. Working through the facade of a coalition of "democratic" parties, the Communists and their allies now hold all of the important positions in the Government, police, and trade unions. Nearly 190,000 party members were purged during 1949-50, but many of these requalified since that time.
Poland, Oct. 26, 1952.	Communist-sponsored Single List ("National Front"): 15,459,849 votes (99.8 percent), 425 deputies and 194 alternates (100 percent).	31,321 votes (0.2 percent), blank ballots; 4,645 invalid votes (0.03 percent).	1,125,000 (estimate, based on official statement of June 15, 1952).	The Communists now have complete control, having eliminated the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) by police pressure in 1947 and having got rid of the Socialists as an independent force through absorption of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) in December 1948. The Communist component in the 1948 fusion was about 1 million in a combined membership of 1,500,000. Aside from the merged party (United Polish Workers' Party—PZPR), the only legal political parties are 3 insignificant fellow-traveling groups calling themselves the United Peasant Party (ZSL), the Democratic Party (SL), and the Social Catholic Club (KKS).
Rumania, Nov. 30, 1952.	People's Democratic Front: 10,233,369 votes (98.94 percent), 423 seats (100 percent).	120,100 blank votes.	720,000 (claim, June 23, 1950).	The Communist Party (Rumanian Workers' Party), formed through fusion of the Communist and Social Democratic Parties in February 1948, seized power as a direct result of Soviet occupation and has had control of the country since

U. S. S. R., Mar. 12, 1950 (elections scheduled for Mar. 14, 1954).	"Bloc of Communists and Non-Party Peoples": 110,789,377 votes (99.73 percent), 678 seats (100 percent), Council of the Union; 110,782,909 votes (99.72 percent), 638 seats (100 percent), Council of Nationalities; 700 seats announced for Council of Union, 631 seats announced for Council of Nationalities (additional seats representing military personnel on foreign service will be announced after election; probably will be 7 in number as in 1950 for each council).	None	6,882,145 members and candidate members claimed officially in October 1952. In 1953 Soviet publications referred to 7 million members, possibly a rounding off of the 1952 figure.	1945. Communists now control the trade unions and women's and youth organizations as well as a number of allegedly independent political parties. Organized opposition has been entirely eliminated since 1947. The Communist party dominates all political life in the Soviet Union. Its membership is concentrated primarily in the RSFSR. The Ukrainian and Kazakh SSR's have the next largest party membership groupings after the RSFSR. Special efforts have been made to expand party membership in the areas acquired since 1939. During 1949-52 the proportionate growth of party strength in Moldavia, Latvia, and Lithuania was much larger than in the U. S. S. R. as a whole.
Yugoslavia, Mar. 26, 1950.	People's Front Federal Council: 9,059,113 votes (93.23 percent), 405 seats (100 percent). Council of Nationalists: 9,050,683 votes (93.42 percent), 215 seats (100 percent).	Federal Council: 657,837 votes (6.77 percent), no seats. Council of Nationalists: 637,481 votes (6.58 percent), no seats.	779,382 (official claim, VI Congress, November 1952).	Under Tito's control, the Communist Party dominates the political life of Yugoslavia. The trade unions, youth, women's groups, and affiliated organizations, comprising a membership of about 8 million, are completely controlled by Communist leadership. Tito's control over the CPY has been such that few divergencies of significance have come to light in the controversy with the Cominform up to the end of 1953. The name of the party was changed to Union of Communists of Yugoslavia at the VI Congress of the CPY in November 1952.

Central Europe

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status				Communist party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center	Conservative		
Switzerland, October 1951.	Communist Party (Partei der Arbeit): 30,000 votes (4 percent), 5 seats (2.6 percent).	Social Democratic Party: 261,000 votes (26.5 percent), 49 seats (25 percent).	Radical-Democratic Party: 231,000 votes (24 percent), 51 seats (26 percent).	Catholic Conservative Party: 217,000 votes (22 percent), 48 seats (24.5 percent). Peasant Party: 117,000 votes (13 percent), 23 seats (11.7 percent).	8,000 (estimate).	The Communist Partei der Arbeit—Parti du Travail dropped from 50,000 to approximately 30,000 voters in the last 5 years. These losses were caused by intraparty strife, reduction of strength in the trade unions, failure to enlarge the Communist-front organizations, and the endorsement of the unpopular Moscow line. The Communists are unable to attract any segment of the essentially conservative Swiss population. The party is too small to endanger the internal security of the Swiss Confederacy.
Austria, February 1953.	Communist Party: 228,228 votes (5.28 percent), 4 seats (2.42 percent).	Socialist Party: 1,818,811 votes (42.11 percent), 73 seats (44.24 percent).	Austrian People's Party: 1,781,969 votes (11.26 percent), 74 seats (44.84 percent).	Union of Independents (Rightist): 473,022 votes (10.95 percent), 14 seats (8.48 percent). Various minor groups: 17,244 votes (0.40 percent), no seats.	60,000 (estimate)	Not a major party before the war, the Communist Party profited from the effective support of the Soviet occupational authorities and national chaos to win parliamentary representation for the first time in 1945. Faced with the intensive enmity of the vast majority of the Austrian people, the Communists have been unable to gain widespread support in Austrian political, social, and cultural organizations. They form a somewhat more cohesive minority in the trade unions, but control no single union and have been deprived of Trade Union "derivation offices by the Socialist TUF leadership.
Germany, (Soviet Zone) Oct. 15, 1950.	The following is the prearranged distribution of seats of the parties (all of which are Communist-controlled) in the East German Parliament: Socialist Unity Party (the Communist Party), 25 percent; Christian Democratic Union, 15 percent; Liberal Democratic Party, 15 percent; National Democratic Party, 7.5 percent; Democratic Peasant Party, 7.5 percent; Free German Trade Union League, 10 percent; Free German Youth, 5 percent; Democratic Women's League, 3.75 percent; Association of Victims of the Nazi Regime, 3.75 percent; Cultural League, 5 percent; Peasant's Mutual Aid Association, 1.25 percent; and Consumer Cooperatives, 1.25 percent.				1,230,000 (estimate) (including Berlin).	The Communist Party, called the Socialist Unity Party (SED), runs the political life of the East Zone with the support of Soviet occupation authorities. The German Democratic Republic was set up in October 1949 for the Soviet Zone and its government is completely under Communist domination. So-called non-Communists in the cabinet are Communist tools. Communists have continued to expand their control over all phases of East German life through centralization of activities and the development of a strong security and police apparatus. In 1951, the SED sharply reduced the size of its membership.

Germany, (Western Zones) Federal Republic Sept. 6, 1953.	Communist Party: 607,634 votes (2.2 percent), no seats.	Social Democratic Party: 7,944,252 votes (28.8 percent). 151 seats (31 percent).	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union: 12,444,549 votes (45.2 percent). 244 seats (50.1 percent). Center Party: 217,078 votes (0.8 percent). 2 seats (0.4 percent).	Free Democratic Party: 2,629,473 votes (9.5 percent). 48 seats (9.9 percent). German Party: 896,944 votes (3.3 percent). 15 seats (31 percent). Association of the Disfranchised and Disfranchised: 1,616,123 votes (5.9 percent). 27 seats (5.5 percent). Miscellaneous Various Minor Groups Neutralists and Independents: 729,707 votes (2.6 percent). no seats.	125,000 (estimate).	During 1953 the West German Communist Party (KPD) suffered further sharp electoral setbacks and lost its representation in the Federal Parliament. The party is now completely isolated and plays only a minor political role. Whatever significance it has stems from the fact that it is the tool of the East German regime. The areas of relative Communist strength remain as before—the Ruhr, Hamburg, Bremen, Mannheim, Stuttgart, Ludwigshafen. The party retains some strength among certain segments of the working population, such as miners, metalworkers, and dock workers, which allows it to send delegates to union conventions and fill seats in the works councils. However, its members are excluded from executive and administrative jobs in the unions. The influence of communism on the social and cultural life of West Germany is practically nil.
Germany: Berlin city assembly elections, Dec. 3, 1950.	Communist Party: The Socialist Unity Party did not participate in the elections which were held in the western sectors of Berlin only.	Social Democratic Party: 654,211 votes (41.7 percent). 61 seats (48 percent).	Christian Democratic Union: 361,050 votes (24.6 percent). 34 seats (26.8 percent). Free Democratic Party: 337,589 votes (23 percent). 32 seats (25.2 percent).	German Party: 53,810 votes (3.7 percent). Refugee Party: 31,918 votes (2.2 percent). Miscellaneous: 25,892 votes (1.8 percent).	70,000 (estimate).	The Berlin SED is, for all practical purposes, an integral part of the East Zone SED, and as such, operates within the SED pattern. Although it is active to some extent in west Berlin, the party has been unable to attract any following of consequence there. Like its parent organization in the Soviet Zone, the Berlin SED probably thinned its ranks during 1951 as a result of the general screening process.

Western Europe

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status				Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center	Conservative		
Netherlands, June 1952.	Communist Party: 328,571 votes (6.16 percent), 8 seats.	Labor Party: 1,545,414 votes (29.97 percent), 30 seats (30 percent).	Catholic People's Party: 1,529,464 votes (29.67 percent), 30 seats (30 percent).	Calvinist Parties, Freedom and Democracy Party, Catholic National Party: 1,524,013 votes (34.19 percent), 34 seats (34 percent).	33,000 (estimate).	In the national elections of June 1952, the Communist Party reached its lowest level in both popular vote and parliamentary representation since the elections of 1937. The most striking postwar losses occurred in the 1949 municipal elections when 102 Communist council seats were lost and in the 1950 provincial elections with the Communists lost 27 seats. The continuing decline in Communist strength is due mainly to the rapid economic recovery of the Netherlands, the lack of success of the Communist-dominated EVC labor federation, general distrust of Communist motives since Korea and the strict adherence to the Moscow line by the Dutch Communists. The main centers of Communist strength are in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague where the Communists polled, respectively, 22.36, 9.6, and 6.6 percent of the total vote in the 1952 national elections.
Belgium, June 4, 1950.	Communist Party: 234,541 votes (4.7 percent), 7 seats (3.3 percent).	Socialist Party: 1,795,751 votes (34.5 percent), 77 seats (36.3 percent).	Socialist Christian Party: 2,356,698 votes (47.7 percent), 108 seats (50.9 percent).	Liberal Party: 556,192 votes (11.3 percent), 21 seats (9.4 percent).	30,000 (estimate).	In the national elections of June 1950, the Belgian Communist Party's parliamentary representation and percentage of the total vote fell to the lowest level since 1932. Communist strength in the labor movement is at its lowest postwar level. The industrial areas of Liege and Hainaut Province remain the primary centers of party strength. Communists have been eliminated from positions of control in the Socialist trade union federation (Federation Generale du Travail de Belgique—FGTB). The Communists, however, retain some local strength within the FGFB, primarily in its public service union, and, to a lesser extent, among the dockers, metallurgists, and white-collar workers. In the communal elections of October 1952 the

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Luxembourg, June 3, 1951. Communist Party: 4 seats (5 percent). Socialist Party: 19 seats (32 percent). Christian Social: 21 seats (44 percent). Democratic Group: 8 seats (estimated).

: Percentage of the total vote.

Communists (in the 148 communes of 10,000 population and over where most of their strength is located) won 58 seats as compared with 145 in 1946, and their total vote declined from 228,431 in 1946 to 113,466 in 1952.

Communist strength in Luxembourg is concentrated almost entirely in the southern industrial districts and in the mining, iron, and steel trade unions. In the June 1951 elections held in the Northern and Central districts for half of the members of the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, the Communists lost their only contested seat, or one-fifth of their parliamentary representation, and received 50 percent less of the popular vote than in 1945. The decline in Communist influence in the country as a whole, moreover, was reflected in the communal elections of October 1951 when the Communists lost 12 of the 21 local seats which they have held since 1945.

Western Europe—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status				Communist party membership	Source of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center	Conservative		
France, June 17, 1951 (seat distribution in National Assembly as of December 1953).	Communist Party: 4,926,530 votes (25.7 percent), 100 seats (16 percent).	Socialist Party: 2,794,214 votes (14.6 percent), 105 seats (17 percent).	Popular Republican: 2,353,544 votes (12.3 percent), 88 seats (14 percent). Left Rally (Radical Socialists and U. D. S. R.): 2,194,213 votes (11.5 percent), 101 seats (15 percent).	Gaullists: 4,134,555 votes (21.0 percent), 79 seats (13 percent). Right-Wing Group (Peasants, Independent Republicans, and former Gaullists): 2,496,570 votes (13.1 percent), 136 seats (21 percent).	450,000 (estimated).	The French Communist Party is strong particularly in electoral strength and trade-union support. At the polls it is the largest single political party and in the labor movement it controls the largest labor union. It also continues to operate numerous front organizations, although many of these are now "paper" organizations, and it has an extensive party press. Nevertheless, the decline of the party as measured in actual membership and, above all, in political influence, has been very considerable since 1947-48. During recent years the Communists have been unable to carry off successfully mass demonstrations or political strikes, thus showing that the great majority of the persons who vote Communist or belong to the Communist-dominated trade union will not participate in political actions called for by the party. The party has also been displaying signs of internal disunity, as seen particularly in the Marty-Tillon case of 1952-53 and its activities are curbed by various anti-Communist measures taken by the Government. At the same time, however, the Communists managed during the last quarter of 1953 to break part way out of the political isolation in which they had been kept by the other parties ever since they were expelled from the Cabinet in 1947. This they did by making contact with non-Communists who happened to side with them against the EDC (European Defense Community), continuation of the Indochina war, or the rightist trend of the Government. In some cases the non-Communists joined forces with the Communists; in other cases they were merely given unsolicited Communist support. These developments stirred speculation in France that the Communists were try-

Italy, June 7-8, 1953:
Chamber of Deputies seats as of July 2, 1953.

Communist Party (PCI) and Allied Left Wing Socialists (PSI): PCI, 6,120,709 votes (22.6 percent); 143 seats (24.2 percent); PSI, 3,441,014 votes (12.7 percent), 75 seats (12.7 percent).

Social Democratic Party (PSDI): 1,222,957 votes (4.5 percent), 19 seats (3.2 percent).

Christian Democratic Party (DC): 10,984,547 votes (40.6 percent), 265 seats (44.9 percent).
Republican Party (PRI): 438,149 votes (1.6 percent), 5 seats (0.8 percent).
Liberal Party (PLI): 815,929 votes (3 percent), 14 seats (2.4 percent).

Italian Social Movement (MSI) Fascist: 1,579,888 votes (5.8 percent), 29 seats (4.9 percent).
National Monarchist Party (PNM): 1,854,850 votes (6.9 percent), 40 seats (6.8 percent).

1,700,000 (estimated).

ing to lay the groundwork for a new popular front, but, in fact, the party continued to pursue unity-from-below tactics. Meanwhile the non-Communist parties remained firmly anti-Communist and regarded such agreement as they registered with the Communists as being purely coincidental and limited to specific issues.

The Communists (PCI), supported by the Left-wing (Neuni) Socialists (PSI), dominate the political left in Italy. Despite some membership losses in recent years they have continued to gain in electoral support. In the national elections of June 7-8, 1953, the 2 parties rose to 35.3 percent of the valid vote from 34.7 percent in the 1951-52 local elections and 31.0 percent in the 1948 parliamentary elections. Communist and Neuni Socialist elements control the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL), which remains the largest trade union organization in Italy despite the competition of the non-Communist labor groups which have appeared since 1948. The Communists also dominate a number of important front organizations. The Communist Youth Federation claimed 455,000 members (November 1952). While the membership strength of the PCI proper has declined only slightly over the past 2 years, the size of the Youth Federation fluctuated considerably during this period. Communist strength is concentrated primarily in the urban industrial areas of northern Italy and in the agricultural regions of Emilia and Tuscany. The poverty-stricken south, however, contributed the largest gains to the party's electoral strength between 1948 and 1953, while the Communists' voting support in the north has been more or less stabilized.

Western Europe--Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status				Communist party membership	Source of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center	Conservative		
Greece, Nov. 16, 1952	United Democratic Left (EDA): 179,679 votes (11.3 percent), no seats. (It is the legal front of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), which was outlawed in 1947. Through EDA, the KKE enjoys a defacto recognition in Greek politics and public affairs.)	Socialists cooperated with the center. No seats in Parliament.	EPEK-Liberal Party coalition: 577,678 votes (36.6 percent), 61 seats (coalition broke up after the election).	Greek Rally: 779,982 votes (49.3 percent), 289 seats.	20,000 (estimate)	The Greek Communist Party (KKE) exploits mainly Greece's low standard of living and the unequal distribution of wealth, but the Greek masses have resisted communism primarily because it is identified with the principal foes of Hellenism: Panslavs, pagans and barbarians. The KKE and its principal organs were outlawed on Dec. 27, 1947. After the defeat of the Communist guerrillas in August 1949, the KKE developed a legal front known as the United Democratic Left (EDA), which has been voicing the Communist line since the elections of March 1950. The leadership of the Communist movement comes largely from the educated professional class and the rank and file is drawn from industrial and agricultural labor and, to a lesser extent, white-collar workers. In the national elections of 1952 the EDA received about 12 percent of the popular vote--an increase of about 1 percent from the previous elections--but failed to elect a deputy to Parliament. An estimate based on the elections places about 350,000 adults in the Communist-led left wing. In the 1951 elections, held under the proportional representation system, EDA polled 180,640 votes (10.6 percent) and elected 10 deputies to Parliament. In the by-elections since 1952, EDA has slightly increased its popular following. The principal KKE propaganda and communication instruments are the clandestinely published party organ, Rizospastis. EDA has its daily press organ, published legally in Athens under the name Avgi.

Ireland, May 1951.....	<p>Communist Party: No official Communist Party exists.</p> <p>Labor Party: 152,231 votes (11.4 percent), 16 seats.</p> <p>Clann na Poblachta: 54,210 votes (4.1 percent), 2 seats (1.4 percent).</p> <p>Fianna Fail: 617,570 votes (46.3 percent), 69 seats (46.9 percent).</p> <p>Independents: 128,529 votes (9.6 percent), 14 seats (9.5 percent).</p> <p>Fine Gael: 342,844 votes (25.7 percent), 40 seats (27.2 percent).</p> <p>Clann na Talmhan: 38,572 votes (2.9 percent), 6 seats (4.1 percent).</p>	150 (estimate)	<p>There is no official Communist Party. Principal Communist group is small Irish Workers League (membership about 100). No prominent trade union leader is known to be a Communist. Communists are active in a few front organizations, but have extremely small following and public influence.</p>
Spain.....	<p>The Spanish regime is a coalition of conservative groups under the dictatorship of Generalissimo Franco. These groups consist of the Falange, the only legal party or movement, the army, the church, and the conservative business and landholding classes. A majority of the members of the Cortes, or Parliament, are appointed by Franco from among these groups.</p>	5,000 (estimate)	<p>The Spanish Communist Party is outlawed but engages in some clandestine activities. Traditionally, it has had to contend with the anti-Communist sentiments of the vast majority of the Spanish people, including those also opposed to the present regime, the hostility of the Government and its security forces, and dissension within its own ranks.</p>
Portugal.....	<p>Portugal is governed by an authoritarian regime under the control of Prime Minister Salazar. Only 1 legal party, the National Union, is allowed to function. All members of the National Assembly, the Portuguese Parliament, are members of the National Union movement.</p>	3,500 (estimate)	<p>Communist success in Portugal has been negligible because of the stability and anti-Communist character of the regime, the strict supervision and repression of subversive forces and the anti-Communist convictions of the overwhelming majority of the people. Attempts by the Communist Party to infiltrate other organizations have resulted in the discrediting or outlawing of these groups.</p>

North Africa

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
Algeria, June 1951.....	Algeria, an integral part of the French Republic, is represented in the French National Assembly by 30 deputies, 2 of whom are Communists. The Communists have consistently lost votes in recent local elections.	15,000 (estimate)....	The Communist position in Algeria remains extremely weak. Attempts by the Communists to form a united front with the nationalists have failed, at least for the present. Communist policy calls for concentration on economic grievances.
Tunisia.....	There is neither a national parliament nor representation in the French National Assembly. Tunisia is a protectorate of France, nominally headed by its own ruler, the Bey of Tunis. The effective governor of Tunisia is the French resident general, who reports to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris.	1,000 (estimate)....	The Communists in Tunisia have been more successful among Europeans than among Moslems, since the nationalist parties have secured the loyalty of the majority of the Tunisian Moslems. Both the Communist Party and the Communist-dominated labor union, USTL, are relatively weak in Tunisia. The Nationalist union, UGCT, which is affiliated with the ICFTU, remains the principal labor force in Tunisia. Both the Nationalist Party and labor union refuse to cooperate with the Communists. Most of the Communist Party's top leaders have been under arrest and its French and Arabic language weeklies suspended since March 1952.
French Morocco.....	There is neither a national Parliament nor representation in the French National Assembly. The Communist Party is illegal. The Government of France holds a protectorate over the whole of Morocco, which legally is headed by the Moroccan Sultan. France actually governs only the French Zone, Spain, and an international committee of control governing the Spanish and international zones, respectively.	4,000 (estimate)....	The Moroccan Communist Party has continued to decline seriously in strength both among Europeans and Moslems, and has made no headway in persuading the nationalist parties to form a common front with them. Moslem laborers, legally prohibited from forming or joining labor unions, continue under governmental toleration to belong to the Communist-dominated UGSCM, the only European labor union seeking Moslem membership. Recently, however, Moroccan nationalists have gained control over a substantial number of UGSCM union offices. The Communist Party and its newspapers were outlawed in December 1952.
Spanish Morocco.....	No electoral system. Communist political activity has been outlawed.	Negligible.....	There is no evidence of an active, organized Communist Party, although sporadic efforts of small Communist groups are known to the public.
Libya.....	No Communists in Parliament. The Government of Libya is a constitutional monarchy operating under a federal system of organization.	Almost none.....	Communist influence, strongest in a small group of Italian left wingers active in labor unions, has declined since deportation of the chief pro-Communist Italians in November 1951.

Africa, south of the Sahara

French West Africa (election of representatives for French Assembly, June 17, 1951)	French West Africa, now legally a federation of French overseas territories, is governed largely as a colony, but its voters send representatives to the French parliamentary bodies in Paris. French West Africa is governed by a governor general, responsible to the French Minister of Overseas Territories in Paris.	Unavailable.....	There is no public party bearing the name "Communist Party." The Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) until 1955 was known to have very close Communist connections and often followed the Communist line, but in 1955 it officially broke relations with the Communists. However, some of the RDA chiefs and local leaders objected vigorously to the break and to the new anti-Communist line and have remained Communists. All of the territorial divisions of RDA are reported to have rallied to the new anti-Communist line of RDA after a period of considerable internal squabbling. Marxist study groups, once allied with the RDA, have virtually disintegrated since the change in RDA policy. Present indications are that the anti-Communist forces are in relatively firm control of RDA party activities and will continue to extend their control in territorial and local
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areas. The Communists have sought to infiltrate and gain control of the labor union, but have met with only limited success.

French Equatorial Africa (election of representatives for French Assembly, June 17, 1951).	French Equatorial Africa, now legally a federation of French overseas territories, is governed largely as a colony, but its voters send representatives to the French parliamentary bodies in Paris. French Equatorial Africa is governed by a governor-general, responsible to the French Minister of Overseas Territories in Paris.	do.	areas. The Communists have sought to infiltrate and gain control of the labor unions but have met with only limited success.
British Africa: A. British West Africa: Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria.	There are no Communist members of the legislative bodies in the trust territories, colonies, and protectorates administered under the authority of the United Kingdom Government.	Negligible; small number of isolated individuals.	There is no Communist Party in French Equatorial Africa. There are individual Communists whose influence, however, is limited. The native party, RDA, was formerly a Communist front but it broke with the Communists in 1950. RDA is now extremely weak in French Equatorial Africa. It ran candidates only in 1 area in the local elections for the territorial assemblies in March 1952 and they, as well as individual Communist candidates were badly beaten. The government has for some time sought to keep known agitators out of the area. The Communists have only limited influence in labor unions.
B. British Central Africa: Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland.			In British West Africa there are no Communist-controlled organizations. A WFTU attempt to dominate the labor movement in the Gold Coast was rebuffed recently when the Prime Minister returned the power of the dominant political party, the Convention People's Party, against the 2 most active supporters of the WFTU. West Africans studying abroad constitute the group most exposed to the influence of Communists. On their return to West Africa some echo Communist propaganda of colonial relations and Communist arguments against colonial powers. These suit their political objectives. They are not seeking to place communism as such, however, but to achieve their nationalistic objectives through opposing the same western states that communism opposes. The former students and others actively opposing the British Government have been given much verbal support by European Communists and a small amount of financial support, but there is no evidence that they are being controlled or directed by foreign Communists. Communist literature circulates in part for the above reasons, in part because of its cheapness and the profits to be made by distributing it.
C. British East Africa: Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika.			Certain nationalist leaders, such as Jomo Kenyatta, have been exposed to Communist influence while abroad, but there is no evidence of any direct affiliation with the Communist movement. No evidence of Communist inspiration or direction of the Mau Mau terrorist movement in Kenya, has emerged thus far although it has provided a convenient theme for Communist propaganda abroad.
Belgian Congo.	No electoral system or political parties exist in the Belgian Congo. The territory is administered by a governor-general who is responsible to the Belgian Minister of Colonies.	None.	Some disconnected Communist efforts have appeared in the Congo, but with little effective results reported to date among either Europeans or natives.
Ethiopia.	Absolute monarchy with supreme power vested in the Emperor. No formal electoral system or political parties as yet, but legislation providing for general elections to Parliament is expected to be enacted during 1953.	do.	The Soviet Legation in Addis Ababa is conducting propaganda activities by means of a permanent library and information center, but there is no known organized Communist group among the Ethiopians.
Liberia.	An independent republic with a strong executive and a virtually unopposed dominant party. The latter finds its main strength in the coastal regions and among the families descended from repatriated American slaves. There are no Communists in Parliament.	do.	None.

The Near East

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
Syria, Oct. 18, 1953	Republic led by President Adib Shishakli. Communist Party is illegal, but 6 Communist candidates ran in the 1953 parliamentary elections though only 1, a Kurd, was elected.	10,000 ¹ (estimate)	Following Soviet support of the partition of Palestine the SCP was officially outlawed on Dec. 17, 1947, but it continues to function as an underground organization. Since January 1951, the Syrian Communists have merged with the Lebanese Communists into 1 organization. Party efforts concentrate on Partisans of Peace activities, workers and youth and student organizations, minority groups, certain intellectual circles, and Arab refugees.
Lebanon, June 5, 1953	Parliamentary Republic. Communist party is illegal. Communist-backed candidates did poorly in 1953 elections.	8,000 ¹ (estimate)	The LCP, legalized in 1942, was outlawed in January 1948, but is active as an underground organization. The Partisans of Peace organizations operate legally. Since January 1951, the Lebanese Communists have merged with the Syrian Communists into a single organization. The LCP has considerable influence among certain labor organizations, youth groups, minorities, and intellectual circles. Beirut is the center of Communist propaganda activity in the Near East. A Conference of Peoples of the Near and Middle East was held in Beirut on Dec. 18-19, 1953. Communist representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran attended.
Israel, July 30, 1951 election to the Kneset (Parliament).	Parliamentary Republic governed by Mapai, General Zionist, Progressive and Religious Coalition. Mapai (Moderate Socialist), 47 seats; General Zionist (Procapitalist), 20 seats; Mapam (pro-Soviet, non-Communist), 11 seats; Left Socialist (pro-Communist), 2 seats; Hapoel Hamizrahi (Religious Socialist), 8 seats; Herut (Rightist), 8 seats; Communists, 5 seats; Progressives, 4 seats; Agudat Israel (Religious), 3 seats; Israel Arab Democrats, 3 seats; Poale Agudat Israel (Religious), 2 seats; Mizrahi (Religious), 2 seats; Sephardic and Oriental Group, 2 seats; Progress and Work (Arab), 1 seat; Farmers and Development (Arab), 1 seat; Israel Association of Yemen, 1 seat.	2,800 Jewish members; 900 Arab members (estimate).	In the Arab area Communist strength is centered in Nazareth; Haifa and Tel Aviv are the centers among the Jews. The Communist Party has recruited new members from a minority among Arabs and among Jewish immigrants from Poland, the Balkans, and Iraq. In foreign policy matters, the Communist Party receives support from Mapam.

Iraq.....	Constitutional monarchy. Government since 1932 generally in the hands of small prowestern group headed by General Nuri al-Sa'id.	1,000 (estimate) (illegal)	Since 1949 the Iraqi Government has periodically arrested and imprisoned leaders of the Communist Party. Except for its Moscow-trained chief, therefore, the present leadership is young and relatively ineffective. Discipline has been difficult to maintain and splinter movements are frequent. Recruiting has been handicapped by the uncongeniality of the orthodox Communist line to Iraqis, most of whom join for motives of Arab nationalism. An even greater handicap has been that local organizations from which the Communists have sought to gain a mass following (e. g., workers' organizations and 2 opposition political parties) are themselves weak and relatively impotent in the face of government pressure. Communist strength is derived largely from the young urban "intelligentsia"—teachers, students, minor officials—especially when these are members of minority groups. The party is attracting large following among growing unemployed element in Basra port. There is a large but quiescent Partisans of Peace movement. More active front groups in the past have been the Union of Students and a Communist faction in the semi-official Lawyers' Association, an otherwise respectable professional organization.
Jordan.....	Constitutional monarchy. Communist Party is illegal. Jordan maintains no relations with the U. S. S. R. and does not permit Soviet citizens to enter its territory.	250 (estimate) plus 1,000 active supporters.	Communist activity in Jordan has increased noticeably since the annexation of former Arab Palestine, with its relatively large number of westernized urban Arabs alienated from the West by the loss of their property in what is now Israel. The party has had growing success in capitalizing on nationalist and other discontent, mainly against Israel and the British, but the strength of its ideological appeal is negligible. Relatively few members came from refugee camps, but a relatively large number are from the upper classes. The party has been subject to vigorous Government repression. Communist literature and agitators made their first appearance in connection with the October 1953 labor disturbances in al-Hasa province in eastern Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia.....	Absolute monarchy. No anti-Communist legislation, but Government does not tolerate Communists.	None	
Yemen.....	Absolute monarchy. No anti-Communist legislation known, but Government does not tolerate Communists.	do	No Communist activity is in evidence
Egypt.....	Governed under emergency decrees by Military Revolutionary Command Council. Communist activity is illegal.	Less than 3,000 (estimate)	The Egyptian Government suppressed all the Communist-line papers in late 1952. Some of the more important Communists were arrested in 1953 and put on trial; many of them are still being detained. Communist activity, chiefly of a propaganda nature, continues on a clandestine basis, largely among students, industrial labor, and the feminist movement, and in the foreign and minority communities. The Communist movement is split into 3 or more separate factions.
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.....	A transitional rule under British guidance leading toward independence within 3 years. Communist activity is illegal.	200 or 300 (estimate)	There is growing evidence of Communist activity, due in part to less effective Government repression. Communist influence is particularly strong in the Railway Workers Union and seems to be increasing among the more advanced peasantry. A fellow-traveling representative was elected to the new Sudanese Parliament in 1953.

¹ Estimates vary mainly because membership is not always broken down into separate figures for the 2 countries.

The Middle East

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status					Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	After elections of May 14, 1950				Estimated current composition (February 1954) assembly seats		
	Party	Assembly seats	Popular vote	Percent of popular vote			
Turkey, May 14, 1950 (next elections, May 2, 1954).	Democratic.....	395	4,242,831	53.59	387	Very few CP members; the number of pro-Communist elements, though conjectural, is very small.	Pro-Communists have failed to obtain any significant influence in Turkey, although a few have been active in the intellectual and industrial life of the country. Their influence is limited because traditional suspicion of Russian intentions makes communism unpopular in Turkey, and the Turkish police are zealous in enforcing the severe laws against Communist activity. A trial of about 170 Communists, involving most of the country's known or suspected Communists, began in the fall of 1953.
	Republican People's	69	3,165,096	39.98	53		
	Nation.....	1	240,209	3.03	2		
	Independent.....	9	267,955	3.40	18		
	Vacancies.....	13			23		
	Peasant.....				4		
	Total.....	487	7,916,091	100.00	487		
Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status	Communist Party membership			Source of Communist strength		
Iran (new elections underway January-February 1954).	Tudeh Party (Communist) declared illegal Feb. 5, 1949; Kurdish Democratic Party and Azerbaijan Democratic Party.	20,000 (estimate before the coup). In view of severe official actions against Tudeh since Aug. 19, 1953, it is impossible to estimate size of current active membership.			General Zahedi's replacement of Mosadeq as Prime Minister on Aug. 19, 1953, marked initiation of vigorous and continuous attempts to destroy Tudeh organization. Police vigilance and official suppression have prevented significant overt Tudeh and Communist-front activity and, it appears, have crippled covert activity. So long as active suppression continues, revival of Tudeh power is likely to be slow. In general, Tudeh strength in Iran derives from belief held by significant numbers of skilled and unskilled workers, students, teachers, and subordinate Government employees, particularly in urban centers, that Tudeh Party alone is desirous of and able to break monopoly of social, political, and economic power held by traditional governing groups for benefit broader public. The Zahedi coup probably enhanced the ability of Tudeh to form a united front with pro-Mosadeq groups.		

The Middle East—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status					Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center	Conservative-Communal	Independents		
Afghanistan, April 1952. National Assembly: 138 seats.	There are no organized political parties in Afghanistan. Most of the members of the National Assembly support the Government; there are no Communist members.					Negligible	Communism appears to have little popular following in Afghanistan.
Pakistan. General elections have not been held. Date, which depends upon finalization of new constitution, has not been set.	Azad Pakistan Party (Pro-Communist): 1 seat.		Pakistan Muslim League: 60 seats.	Congress Party of Pakistan: 13 seats.		5,000 maximum (estimate).	The Communist Party of Pakistan is attempting to form a united front against the Muslim League regime in Pakistan and against the western democracies. After earlier unsuccessful attempts to build on a program of force and violence, the party is currently showing preference for more constitutional methods. Major emphasis is placed on creating demands and occasions for united-front action at popular levels on common issues like the release of political prisoners, food shortages and prices, trade problem, provincial language, autonomy, etc. While the party's present program enables it to function openly and participate in elections, it has not resulted in the building of any united opposition under Communist leadership. The party remains as it has always been in Pakistan—a small organization with little popular support. Most of its support appears to come from professional, student, and labor elements. The party has long been plagued with factionalism, and defections have been common. This, together with financial difficulties, greatly limits its capabilities.

South Asia

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status					Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist left	Center	Conservative-Communal	Independents		
Ceylon, May 1952, 2,334,306 votes polled; 95 elected seats and 6 appointed seats.	Ceylon Communist Party (Stalinist): 134,528 votes (5.8 percent), 4 seats (4.2 percent); present strength 5 seats (5.3 percent). Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Revolutionary) (Stalinist): 1 seat (1 percent). Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Trotskyite): 305,114 votes (13 percent), 9 seats (9.5 percent); present strength 5 seats (5.3 percent).	Sri Lanka Freedom Party: 362,171 votes (15.3 percent), 9 seats (10 seats or 10.5 percent) as result of merger with People's Republican Party. Federalist Party: 45,331 votes (1.9 percent), 2 seats (2.2 percent).	United National Party: 1,026,680 votes (43.4 percent), 58 seats (61 percent). Labor Party: 27,978 votes (1.2 percent), 1 seat (1 percent).	Tamil Congress: 27,978 votes (1.2 percent), 1 seat (1 percent).	Support for the United National Party, 5 seats (5.3 percent). Support for the Leftists, 4 seats (4.2 percent).	Less than 2,000 (estimate).	The Ceylon Communist Party is presently following a broad united front policy and is placing emphasis on peace, cultural and propaganda activities, and support for labor. The western and southern parts of the island where labor is concentrated appear to be the areas most vulnerable to Communist influence. The party has recently gained additional parliamentary and popular strength by defections from the larger Ceylon Trotskyite Party.
India, October 1951-February 1952. House of the People: 105,987,318 votes polled; 489 elected seats and 8 appointed seats.	Communist Party of India (Stalinist): 4,721,009 votes (4.5 percent), 23 seats (4.6 percent). Revolutionary Socialist Party of India (Trotskyite): 393,984 votes (0.4 percent), 2 seats (0.4 percent). Peasants' and Workers Party: 1,169,369 votes (1.1 percent), 2	Praja Socialist Party (formed from merger of Socialist Party and Kisan Mazdur Praja Party): 17,235,126 votes (16.3 percent), 21 seats (25 seats or 5.1 percent as result of byelections up to June 30, 1953). Four other parties: 4,417,285 votes (4.2 per-	Indian National Congress Party: 47,557,362 votes (44.9 percent), 363 seats (358 seats or 72 percent as result of byelections up to June 30, 1953).	Ganatantra Parishad: 966,972 votes (0.9 percent), 5 seats (1 percent). Hindu Mahasabha: 1,061,444 votes (1 percent), 4 seats (0.8 percent). Tamilnad Tolkiers' Party: 883,282 votes (0.8 percent), 4 seats (0.8 percent). Seven other parties: 7,900,998	Independents 16,717,043 votes (15.8 percent), 40 seats (41 seats or 8.2 percent as result of byelections up to June 30, 1953).	40,000 (estimate).	About 6 months before the general elections, the Communist Party of India (CPI) switched over to a new political line which, abandoning insurrectionary activity, called for the formation of an anti-Congress united front of workers, peasants, and small and middle bourgeoisie. By the time the general elections were held, the new political line of the party had succeeded in calling off Government suppression and reestablishing to a great extent innerparty unity. The Communists participated in the elections and, by playing on local grievances and shrewdly concentrating their efforts in areas where their

<p>Nepal general elections have not as yet been held; target date for first general elections is mid-1955.</p>	<p>seats (0.4 percent). Forward Bloc (Marxist): 988,272 votes (0.9 percent), 1 seat.</p>	<p>cent), 6 seats (1.2 percent).</p>		<p>votes (7.5 percent), 14 seats (2.8 percent).</p>		<p>500-700 (estimate).</p>	<p>strength was greatest, succeeded in establishing themselves as the second largest organized opposition in the national Parliament and the largest in 4 state legislatures. They won a near-majority of state assembly seats in Travancore-Cochin, large minorities in both Hyderabad and Madras States and made a sufficient showing in West Bengal to become the principal opposition in that state. In the newly formed State of Andhra, carved out of the Telugu-speaking area of Madras State, the large Communist representation in the state assembly constitutes a constant threat to the survival of the present Congress Party sponsored coalition government. Communism appears to be strongest among the students and the rural and urban working class.</p> <p>The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) has been under official ban since early 1952 but it continues to operate underground and through front organizations. The CPN is continuing its efforts to build a united front, whipping up anti-Indian sentiment, and consolidating its student and peasant support. CPN has ties with the Communist Party of India, and like the CPI, is faced with the problem of factionalism.</p>
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The Far East

Country	National parliamentary status	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
National Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan).	The Kuomintang, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, is the dominant political party in the Government. The 2 other legal minor parties, the Young China Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, each have a few seats in the Legislative Yuan and 1 nonministerial portfolio in the Executive Yuan.	No basis for estimate.	The Communist Party's underground efforts are directed from the mainland by the party's central committee in Peiping. The National Government's counter-subversive program has, however, greatly reduced the effectiveness of the Communist underground. The chief functions of the Communist network have been to assist any future invasion force and to conduct espionage activities rather than to incite and lead a revolt against the National Government. Pro-Communist propaganda activity is conducted from the mainland largely by the Taiwan League for Democratic Self-Government. Communists appear to have paid little attention to building up their strength among such vital groups as the armed forces, bureaucracy, peasantry, or urban workers although, from time to time, the National Government has announced the arrest and execution of Communists who have infiltrated into the army and Government. The number of these announcements has decreased sharply since late 1952.
Communist China, elections scheduled spring 1954.	A national assembly—the All China People's Congress—is to be established in the near future through nationwide elections, scheduled for completion in the spring of 1954. This body will ratify a new national constitution and elect a new national administration. Until the creation of the Congress, the supreme organ of popular government remains the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), created in 1949. The CPPCC, which is viewed as the institutional embodiment of the Communist-controlled united front, will remain as an advisory body, even after an All China Congress is established. The Communist Party, as such, is represented in the CPPCC by only 16 delegates out of a total of 210. However, most CPPCC delegates, representing other organizations, such as the armed forces and Communist-created mass organizations, are CCP members. Eight small Communist-dominated parties and groups are represented in the CPPCC commanding a total of 142 regular seats. These include: (1) China Democratic League; (2) Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee; (3) Democratic National Construction Association; (4) China Peasants and Workers Democratic Party; (5) China Association for the Promotion of Democracy; (6) Chih Kung Tang; (7) Chiu-an Society, and (8) Taiwan Self Government League. All of these are firmly controlled by the CCP and have no independence of action. Many of them are being gradually overshadowed and supplanted by Communist-	6,100,000 (official estimate, July 1953). Represents an increase of 300,000 over July 1952. Unofficial estimates run as high as 6,300,000.	Despite declared intentions to shift the center of party gravity to urban areas, the Chinese Communist Party remains largely composed of persons from rural backgrounds. As of 1953, at least 80 percent of party members were of peasant origin, and less than 10 percent came from the urban worker class. About 1 out of 6 party members is under 25, and about one-tenth are women. More than one-sixth serve in the armed forces. Since 1951, the CCP has been engaged in a program of party reform, aimed at consolidating swollen party ranks and tightening party discipline. According to incomplete reports, 5 percent of present party membership has failed to meet the new qualifications and will probably be expelled from the party. During 1953, the CCP tightened its admission requirements, restricted admission of peasant members, and concentrated recruitment drives on urban areas.

Outer Mongolia.....	<p>created mass organizations, such as the All China Federations of Commerce and Industry. The new national constitution to be adopted by the All China Congress will probably assign a more explicit position of national leadership to the Communist Party and further restrict the already narrow field of political action enjoyed by the minor parties.</p> <p>Candidates put up by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (Communist), and nonparty bloc won 98.67 percent of the votes cast on June 16, 1951, for delegates to the Great People's Hural. It is not definitely known whether all 295 seats went to the bloc's candidates.</p>
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea).	<p>Five hundred seventy-two members elected in August 1948. Of these 390 (63 percent) ostensibly represent South Korea. (The North Korean regime claimed these 390 were chosen by elections held secretly in the south.) According to the North Korean constitution a second election for the Assembly should have been held before September 1951, but none has yet been called even though the Assembly met in December 1953 for the first time since February 1950. The assembly membership is wholly Communist or Communist-dominated. One hundred fifty-seven members (28 percent) are members of the Korean Labor (Communist) Party and all the others are members of organizations that are a part of the Communist-dominated Democratic Unification Front.</p>
Republic of Korea (South Korea).	<p>Only 181 members are now seated in the National Assembly as against 210 elected in May 1950; 27 fell into North Korean hands during the hostilities, 1 died, and 1 resigned. There have been no elections to establish an Upper House in the legislature as provided for in the July 1952 constitutional amendment, but enabling legislation is now under consideration in the Assembly and the elections may be held before June 1954. The present Assembly, which will then become the Lower House, comes up for election in May 1954. There are believed to be no Communist or Communist-dominated members in the Assembly. Although the political alignments of the conservative membership continue to be fluid, 102 members (56 percent) are presently listed with the Liberal Party, which generally supports President Rhee. The Democratic Nationalist Party has 23 members (13 percent), and the remainder of the Assembly members are registered as independents.</p>

25,000 (claim, December 1947; may have grown slightly since)

Korean Labor Party has over 1 million members according to a January 1953 broadcast from Communist China.

Membership is probably negligible. Most South Korean Communist leaders have been in North Korea since 1948, and membership in the Korean Labor Party and other Communist and Communist-front organizations has been illegal since October 1949.

The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, under Soviet domination, controls all political, economic, and social activity. Some 54 percent of the party's members were working herdsmen at the time of the party's 11th Congress in December 1947; this is much lower than the 75 percent of the total population believed to be engaged in livestock breeding. About 40 percent of the party's members were listed as working intellectuals (i. e., Government officials, office workers, technicians, etc.), even though only about 20 percent of the population as a whole could be so classified. About 5 percent of the party's members were workers; this is slightly higher than the percentage for the country. One-half percent of the members were the children of feudalists and lamas, who comprised the former ruling classes. Around 3,000 party members are women.

Communist organizations totally control the North Korean Government. Under Communist authority all mass organizations in North Korea are combined into a popular front to facilitate rigid minority control of all aspects of life. The Government pretends to represent all Korea, and is supported by Communists and Communist-dominated organizations claiming membership in the south as well as the north.

A Communist underground remains in some localities and small bands of Communist guerrillas remain active, principally in the Chiri Mountain area. However, there is virtually no pro-Communist sympathy among the general population and the Government and all major parties are vigorously anti-Communist. The ROK Government has from time to time announced the discovery of Communist infiltrators into the administration and into the conservative parties.

The Far East—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status				Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist and Communist-dominated	Non-Communist left	Conservative	Independents		
Japan: Lower House (466 seats), Apr. 19, 1953. Seat totals as of Dec. 12, 1953.	Japanese Communist Party: 655,787 votes (1.9 percent), 1 seat. Labor-Farmer Party (Communist-dominated): 358,773 votes (1 percent), 5 seats.	Right Socialist Party: 4,679,647 votes (13.5 percent), 66 seats. Left Socialist Party: 4,596,469 votes (13 percent), 72 seats.	Liberal Party: 13,484,238 votes (39 percent), 229 seats. Progressive Party: 6,186,288 votes (17.9 percent), 77 seats. Japan Liberal Party: 3,054,999 votes (8.8 percent), 8 seats.	Independents: 1,675,810 votes (4.9 percent), 6 seats, 2 vacancies.	Approximately 80,000 (estimate).	The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) became a legal party in Japan in 1945 with the removal of restrictions on civil liberties. During the occupation, however, restrictive measures were progressively instituted to counter subversive party activities, and since the peace treaty became effective the Japanese Government has also enacted legislation to control subversive activities. Since mid-1950 the JCP has transferred much of its leadership, organization and activity underground at the same time that it remains a legal party. As part of its underground apparatus, a paramilitary organization reportedly is in the process of development. The bulk of JCP membership and active sympathizers comes from the intellectuals, white-collar workers, and industrial labor; it draws a larger proportion of its vote from urban areas than almost any other party. Despite some recent gains in influence within organized labor, the JCP does not exercise dominant control over the trade union movement. The Labor-Farmer Party is usually regarded as a satellite of the JCP and certain Left Socialists and independents are also influenced by the Communists. In addition to direct party activities, the JCP exercises influence in varying degree over a series of front organizations designed to attract general popular support for its campaigns for "peace" and closer relations with the Communist bloc and against rearmament and Japan's alignment with the United States.
Upper House (250 seats), Apr. 24, 1953. Triennial elections held for half the membership, divided into 75 seats in prefectural districts and 50 or the nation at large. Seat totals are as of Dec. 4, 1953. Vote totals apply only to prefectural districts in 1953 elections.	Japanese Communist Party: 264,729 votes (0.9 percent), 1 seat. Labor-Farmer Party (Communist-dominated): 277,342 votes (1 percent), 2 seats.	Right Socialist Party: 2,937,902 votes (10.5 percent), 26 seats. Left Socialist Party: 3,917,826 votes (14 percent), 43 seats.	Liberal Party: 8,893,117 votes (31.4 percent), 95 seats. Ryokufukai (Green Breeze Society): 2,096,103 votes (7.5 percent), 48 seats. Progressive Party: 2,849,341 votes (10.1 percent), 17 seats. Japan Liberal Party: 522,540 votes (1.9 percent), 1 seat.	Independents: 6,350,966 votes (22.7 percent), 17 seats.		

¹ In December 1953, 26 members of the Hatoyama or New Liberal Party and 2 independents in the Lower House, and 2 Hatoyama Liberals in the Upper House joined the Liberal Party. The remaining Hatoyama Liberals formed the Japan Liberal Party.

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status		Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist		
Burma, 1951.....	The Communist parties, as such, have no parliamentary representation. The Burma Workers and Peasants Party (BWPP), a Communist-led group which broke with the Burma Socialist Party in December 1950, holds about 4 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.	The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL): The government coalition. Including its dominant element, the Burma Socialist Party, the AFPFL controls about 80 percent of the Chamber of Deputies. People's Peace Front: A leftist group with perhaps 1 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies; members usually follow BWPP. Mahabama: Now represents little more than personal following of Dr. Ba Maw, with 1 seat in the Chamber of Deputies. Minor Parties: Represent ethnic minorities.	Burma Communist Party: 24,000 (1950 claim); under 10,000 (estimate). Communist Party (Burma): Membership small; perhaps in the hundreds. People's Comrades Party: Probably under 1,000. Burma Workers and Peasants Party: Membership unknown; may total a few hundred. China Democratic League: Membership unknown.	The Burma Communist Party (BCP) has been in armed revolt since 1948. Within the past 18 months, its guerrilla forces have been dislodged from some important areas in central Burma. Declared illegal October 1953. For past year, armed violence has been subordinated to political organization. BCP is attempting to create an effective coalition with the CP(B), an illegal group which split from the BCP in 1946, and the PCP, also illegal. Communist offers to form a coalition government and end the insurrection have been ignored by the Burma Government. Since armed revolt has been subordinated to political tactics, the BWPP has become the most active Communist element in Burma. It functions largely as an instrument of pressure on the Government, operating through front groups including labor and student organizations. Principal Chinese Communist organization. Chinese Communist strength is concentrated in Rangoon and principal towns, with some influence among shopkeepers, Chinese labor unions, and Chinese schools.

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
Thailand, 1952. Communists take no part in overt party politics. Membership in Communist organizations illegal since 1952.	The Thai Constitution allows for political parties, but necessary enabling legislation has not been passed. Thus, no formal political parties exist at present. The present National Assembly is composed of members and supporters of the Government, plus a few independent opposition members.	Thai Communist Party: Small; no accurate figures. Chinese Communist Party (Thailand): Estimates vary up to 5,000. Vietnamese Communists: No estimate or claim.	The Thai Communist Party is composed largely of intellectuals, relatively ineffective in comparison with Chinese Communist Party (Thailand). It offers a Thai front for the predominantly Chinese Communist movement as well as a channel for influencing dissatisfied non-Communist Thai. The Chinese Communist Party (Thailand) operates through Chinese labor unions, Chinese schools and newspapers, Chinese social and cultural associations, and some commercial enterprises. Chinese Communist activities center in Bangkok and in the Malaya border area. It is a potential threat to the Thai Government because of its influence among the 3 million Chinese in Thailand and its support from Communist China. Communist elements within the Vietnamese minority in Thailand are primarily engaged in supporting Democratic Republic of Vietnam activities in Indochina. Indochinese Communists are active among the 50,000 Vietnamese refugees of northeast Thailand.

The Far East—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status			Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Bloc supported by Communists	Non-Communist		
Vietnam.....	Vietnam Workers Party (Lao Dong): The Indo-Chinese Communist Party officially dissolved in November 1945, reemerged as the Vietnam Workers Party at a congress held in February 1951 in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ("Viet Minh"). Communist organizations and activities are prohibited in areas under Franco-Vietnamese control.	The Workers Party is in full control of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and of the National United Front (Lien Viet) which includes the numerous subsidiary front organizations within the Viet Minh regime.	Major non-Communist political groupings in Vietnam are the Catholics, the Cao Laists, and the Dai Viet and Vietnam Nationalist Parties. Some of these groupings, notably the Catholics, survive in the Communist zones, although they have been largely driven underground. For the most part these groupings support the anti-Communist policies of the Government of Vietnam headed by Bao Dai.	715,000 (Communist claim).	The Workers Party completely controls the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which includes 54 percent of the total population of Vietnam, or some 13 million people, and about half the territory of Vietnam. Within the DRV, Communists occupy 5 cabinet posts: The Presidency, Vice Presidency, and Ministries of National Defense, Labor, and Finance. Communist cadres have been installed throughout the armed forces and the administration.
Laos, National Assembly, Aug. 26, 1951; 39 seats.	The Resistance Government of Pathet Lao, organized in 1950, operates in close conjunction with the Communist-dominated Democratic Republic of Vietnam. There is no overt Communist activity in areas under control of French Union forces and the Laotian National Army.	The National United Front of Pathet Lao or Neo Lao-Issala Front.	The Laos Union National Party, Progressive Party, and Democratic Party and a number of independents make up the representation of the Laos National Assembly at Vientiane.	Less than 1,000 (estimated).	Communist Viet Minh troops, accompanied by a very small number of Laotian Communists grouped in a Laotian Liberation Army, invaded the territory of Laos in the spring and fall of 1953. In the areas they occupy, political cadres have been installed to consolidate the political position of the Viet Minh and of the puppet Laotian Resistance Government.
Cambodia, National Assembly elected Sept. 9, 1951, was dissolved by the King in January 1953 and an appointed National Consultative Council of 74 members installed on Mar. 2, 1953.	The Cambodian Committee of National Liberation operates in close conjunction with Communist groups in Vietnam and Laos. There is no overt Communist activity in areas under control of French Union forces and Royal Cambodian forces.	The Cambodian National United Front.	The Khmer Renovation, Democratic National Recovery, Liberal, People's, Democratic-Progressive, National Union and Victorious Northeastern Khmer Parties, as well as a number of independents are all opposed to communism.	The number of Communists in Cambodia can be estimated not to exceed 5,000-8,000.	As a result of the recent Viet Minh invasions of Laos, it is anticipated that Viet Minh Communist activity in conjunction with Cambodian resistance groups will increase.

Malaya.....

The Federation of Malaya does not yet have a national electoral system. In the Colony of Singapore some members of the Legislative Council are elected but the Malayan Communist Party has put up no candidates. In June and July 1948 the Malayan Communist Party and its satellite labor, veterans, and youth organizations were banned in the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore.

3,000-5,000, more than 90 percent of whom are Chinese (estimate).

The party directs the approximately 4,000 strong Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLLA), which has been waging guerrilla warfare against British security forces, the civilian population, and the economy of Malaya since mid-1948. The party and army are supported by undercover Min Yuen organizations, whose membership is unknown but may well exceed 50,000. Most Min Yuen members are not party members, but they supply the Communist guerrillas with funds, information, supplies, shelter, and recruits. Since mid-1948 police and military measures have been taken against the Malayan Communist Party, the Malayan Races Liberation Army, and subsidiary Communist-controlled supporting organizations by regular troops, police, and part-time home guards, totaling about 300,000. The difficulty in carrying on operations in the jungle and in exercising administrative control in parts of the country has been an obstacle to the suppression of the Communist terrorism. However, the successful resettlement of a half million Chinese squatters into protected areas (Chinese form nearly half the total population) and the successful execution of other anti-guerrilla measures appear to have led to improvement in security in most areas of Malaya.

The Far East—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary election	National parliamentary status		Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist	Non-Communist		
Indonesia.....	<p>Pending the holding of general elections, party representation in the unicameral parliament continues to be determined by government fiat.</p> <p>Indonesian Communist Party (Stalinist) has 16 votes (7.6 percent), plus 13 votes (6.1 percent) from satellite and allied groups, and about 7 votes (3.3 percent) from nonparty members, giving a theoretical maximum of 36 votes (17.2 percent).</p> <p>Proletarian Party Murba (National Communist) has 4 votes (1.9 percent).</p>	<p>Nonreligious parties:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), 37 votes, 17.6 percent. 2. Great Indonesia Association (PIR), 15 votes, 7.1 percent. 3. Indonesian Socialist Party 15 votes, 7.1 percent. 4. Democratic Faction, 13 votes, 6.1 percent. 5. National People's Party (PRN), 7 votes, 3.3 percent. 6. Labor Party, 5 votes, 2.4 percent. 7. Party of Great Indonesia (Parindra), 4 votes, 1.9 percent. 8. Indonesian People's League (SKI), 3 votes, 1.3 percent. <p>Religious parties:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Moslem League (Masjumi), 39 votes, 18.6 percent. 2. Nahdatul Ulama, 7 votes, 3.3 percent. 3. Catholic Party, 8 votes, 3.8 percent. 4. Protestant Party (Parkindo), 5 votes, 2.4 percent. 5. United Indonesian Islamic Party (PSII), 4 votes, 1.9 percent. <p>To this may be added about 8 votes (3.8 percent) from nonparty members, giving a theoretical total of 170 non-Communist votes in Parliament (80.9 percent).</p>	<p>Indonesian Communist Party: 15,000 (estimate), (30,000 claim, 1951).</p>	<p>Since early 1952 the Indonesian Communist Party has followed a united front policy. It has affected moderate domestic political and economic policies, has been in the forefront in the celebration of national holidays, and, even though it has had no cabinet post, has supported the present government as it did the predecessor Wilopo cabinet. Much of the strength of the Indonesian Communist Party apparently lies in its control of a series of front organizations, most important of which is the largest of the labor federations with a claimed membership of 2,500,000.</p> <p>The Proletarian Party (Murba) follows a line in general indistinguishable from that of the Indonesian Communist Party, but has at times opposed the latter. The Proletarian Party was formerly under the leadership of the late national Communist hero, Tan Malaka.</p>

The Philip- pines, Nov. 10, 1953.	Communist Party (PKP) illegal since May 1951. In the elections for Presi- dent, the party threw its support against Mag- saysay. No stand was taken in the senatorial elections. In the elec- tions for the House, the Communists supported those candidates of whatever party who were considered to be most sympathetic to them.	Senate: Nacionalista Party, 14 members; Liberal Party, 4 members; Demo- cratic Party, 5 members. House of Representatives: Nacionalista Party, 57 members; Liberal Party, 34 members; Democratic Party 3 mem- bers; Independent Party 1 member.	Philippine Communist Party: 3,000 to 5,000 (estimate). Huk strength is probably about 5,000. Chinese Communists in the Philippines probably number 1,000 to 2,000.	Since late 1950, Government raids upon PKP members and vigorous Government efforts to eradicate the Communist element from the labor movement have reduced Communist influence almost exclusively to leadership of the armed Huk movement. By 1953, moreover, the Huk movement in them Visayas apparently had been suppressed; the Huk strength in central and southern Luzon, the long-standing stronghold, has been reduced. PKP influence probably still exists in some labor unions, tenant farmer groups, and women's and youth's leagues, but apparently such organizations have been identified by the Government and driven underground.
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European possessions in the Caribbean

Country	National parliamentary status	Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
French overseas depart- ments in Western Hemi- sphere (Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana).	The Communist Party is the largest political party in Martinique, and 2 of Martinique's 3 deputies in the French National Assembly, elected in June 1951, are members of the party. In Guadeloupe the Commun- ists are less strong, but they nevertheless send 1 of the Department's 3 representatives to the National Assem- bly in Paris. French Guiana, on the other hand, has a weak Communist Party with little political influence.	No basis for estimate..	The Communists' strength in Martinique is traceable to their or- ganized opposition to racial discrimination and their control of most of the local trade unions. The Communists also control a number of the more important municipal governments, but they no longer have the overwhelming majority in nearly every com- mune which they enjoyed at the end of the war. Although less successful in Guadeloupe, the Communists maintain an active organization in both the political and labor fields.
British dependent terri- tories (West Indies, Guiana, and Hondu- ras).	Communists and fellow travelers dominate 2 popular-front parties, the extremely weak West Indian Independence Party in Trinidad and the powerful Peoples' Progressive Party in British Guiana. The latter in April 1953 won 18 of 21 elective seats in the House of Assembly and con- trol of a majority in the executive council, but 6 months later were expelled by the British Government.do.....	Although no legal Communist Party has been established in any of these areas, Communists are active in the West Indian Inde- pendence Party of Trinidad and in the Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP) of British Guiana. The latter controlled much of the governmental machinery from April to October 1953. Although the PPP has lost considerable middle-class support, its mass popularity remains high. A few Communists and Communist sympathizers are active in labor unions in Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana, and some of the small islands. PPP membership is estimated at approximately 5,000.
Netherlands possessions (West Indies, and Guiana (Surinam)).	No Communist parties exist in these territories.....	Small, no estimate....	No legal Communist Party exists here.

Latin America

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status			Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist and pro-Communist	Ruling party or coalition	Opposition		
Argentina, November 1951.	Communist Party (PCA): No seats.	Peronista Party: 175 seats (93 percent).	Radical Party: 14 seats (7 percent) Progressive Democratic Party: No seats. Socialist Party: No seats.	Under 40,000 (estimate), 30,000 (claim, 1947).	The orthodox Communist party, though legal, is under close police surveillance. Since early 1953 it has declared its opposition to the Government, abandoning a previous line of selective and conditional support of Government programs. A group of so-called dissident Communists have consistently supported the Government. They are believed to be loyal to Moscow, although professing strong opposition to the orthodox Argentine Communist Party. Communists and sympathizers have infiltrated organized labor and the press and therefore could probably cause serious trouble in event of a political crisis. In late 1953 various trade unions were reported to have initiated a campaign to oust pro-Communists.
Bolivia, May 1951-----	Communist Party (PCB) (illegal). Revolutionary Workers Party (POR) (Trotskyite). Revolutionary Left Party (PIR) (reportedly dissolved in mid-1952).	National Revolutionary Movement (MNR). (In power since April 1952 when it ousted a military Junta).	Socialist Falange (FSB), Social Democratic Party (PSD), Republican Socialist Union Party (P'USR), Liberal Party.	Under 2,000 (estimate for PCB).	International communism gained a foothold in the 1940's through the Marxist Revolutionary Left Party (PIR) and the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party (POR). The Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) appeared in early 1950 with the separation of a sector of PIR, chiefly youth-student elements, to form an openly Stalinist group. Communist strategy in Bolivia appears to be directed toward infiltrating the MNR administration and its supporting organizations, and obtaining the collaboration of certain ultranationalist and leftist elements within the MNR.
Brazil, October 1950-----	Communist Party (PCB) (illegal): 1 deputy elected on non-Communist ticket.	Social Democratic Party (PSD): 2,068,405 votes (35 percent), 141 seats (38 percent). Brazilian Workers' Party (PTB): 1,262,000 votes (20.7 percent), 63 seats (17 percent). Social Progressive Party (PPS): 558,792 votes (9.2 percent), 31 seats (8 percent).	National Democratic Union (UDN): 1,301,459 votes (21.3 percent), 90 seats (25 percent). Republican Party (PR): 216,207 votes (3.5 percent), 15 seats (4 percent). Socialist Party (PSB): 36,638 votes (0.6 percent), 2 seats (0.6 percent).	About 60,000 (estimate) 130,000 (claim, 1947).	During the period of its legal existence (1945-47) the Communist Party gained an advantageous position in organized labor, considerable political power in the major industrial areas, and a fairly large following among farm labor, women's, and youth groups, and intellectual circles. Early in 1948 the legislative mandates of Communists were canceled, and party leaders became fugitives. In illegality the party lost a number of marginal supporters and lost ground in organized labor and important national organizations representing university students and war veterans. Since 1950 severe economic dislocations in Brazil, accompanied by mounting inflation, have permitted the party to recoup part of its loss in membership and to improve its financial position. Recent efforts of the party have been directed toward infiltration

Chile, March 1953.....

Communist Party
(PCCH) (illegal).
People's Front: 10 seats
(5 percent).

Agrarian Labor (PAL),
Popular Socialist
(PSP), People's
Democratic, National
Christian, Doctrinary
Radical, etc.: 86 seats
(45 percent).

Liberal Party: 33 seats
(17 percent).
Radical: 30 seats (16
percent).
Traditional Conserva-
tive: 22 seats (11 per-
cent).
Social Christian Con-
servative, Falanga,
Agrarian: 12 seats (6
percent).

Under 40,000
(estimate) 50,-
000 (claim 1947).

of Government and other key organizations in order to prevent participation of foreign capital in the development of Brazilian resources and Brazilian cooperation with the West, as well as to promote closer relations, economic and diplomatic, with the Soviet bloc. Communists have been able to maintain a moderate infiltration of Government agencies. They have had some success also, especially on local levels, in electing Communists to governmental office as candidates of legal parties. The party has also been able greatly to increase its propaganda audience and strengthen its influence among non-Communist groups through front organizations which exploit nationalism and isolationism.

The Communist party was virtually outlawed by the defense of democracy law of September 1948, when 28,000 Communists were disenfranchised. The law did not cover Communist youth and women, and some Communist Party members are believed to have infiltrated other parties. Communists have maintained important degree of influence in unions despite the ban on Communist labor activity and have been a force among university students and intellectuals. In the September 1952 presidential elections the Communists joined with a Socialist segment in a "People's Front" which polled about 5 percent of the total vote. The Communists have been very active through their political, labor, and other fronts in propagandizing for extremist solutions of national problems, and have thus to a large extent compensated for their loss of legal status.

The Communists have been weakened by internal dissensions. They lost an important source of strength in 1950 with the split between Liberal and Communist wings of the pro-Liberal labor federation (CTC). Communists still maintain some influence within the labor movement despite the predominance of the non-Communist labor organizations. The poor Communist showing in September 1952 congressional elections suggested, however, that Communist labor support had been greatly undermined. In April 1952, on the 4th anniversary of the Bogota riots, Radio Moscow extolled the Colombian guerrillas, who were in arms against the Conservative Government, as a "national liberation army." Shortly thereafter, the Communist Party announced that it could not "remain indifferent" to the guerrilla struggle, and began to gain some influence in the leadership of 2 or 3 guerrilla groups. Under the Rojas Pinilla regime, which assumed power in June 1953, guerrilla operations were brought to an end and the Communists lost this potential source of strength.

Colombia, March 1953..

Communist Party
(PCC).

Conservative Party.....

Liberal Party, dissident
conservative factions.

Under 5,000 (es-
timate) 10,000
(claim, 1947).

Latin America—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status			Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist and pro-Communist	Ruling party or coalition	Opposition		
Costa Rica, July 1953....	Popular Vanguard (VP) (illegal). Progressive Independent Party (PPI) (illegal).	National Liberation Party: 113,390 votes (64.6 percent), 30 seats (66.6 percent).	Democratic Party: 37,836 votes (21.5 percent), 11 seats (24.4 percent). Independent National Republican Party: 12,134 votes (6.9 percent), 3 seats (6.6 percent). National Union Party: 12,159 votes (6.9 percent), 1 seat (2.2 percent).	Under 5,000 (estimate) 20,000 (claim, 1947).	The Popular Vanguard (Communist) Party was a leading faction within the Government prior to the April 1948 revolution which installed an anti-Communist governing Junta. The latter outlawed the party in July 1948, and exiled some of its leaders. The 1949 constitution sanctioned anti-Communist action and subsequently Communist activities have been kept under surveillance. Nevertheless, certain Communist leaders have returned to resume operations in Costa Rica. In early 1953, the Communists were able to organize a labor confederation to take the place of one previously dissolved by the Government. However, a newly formed Communist front political party was declared illegal and was not allowed to participate in the 1953 presidential elections.
Cuba, June 1950.....	Popular Socialist Party (PSP) (illegal).	Progressive Action Party (PAP). Radical Union Party (PUR). Democrata Party, Liberal Party (Congress was suspended in March 1952).	Cuban Revolutionary Party (Autentico). Party of the Cuban People (Ortodoxo). Factions of Democrata and Liberal Parties.	Under 30,000 (estimate) 30,000 (claim 1950).	Since coming to power in March 1952, the Batista government has taken various measures to restrict Communist activity, including the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the closing down of Communist publications. In November 1953, it declared unlawful the interventionist activities of international communism and prohibited all organizations aiding or facilitating such activities. Consequently, it is likely that to an increasing extent Cuban Communists will endeavor to infiltrate non-Communist organizations. The party's influence remains strongest in youth and women's organizations, and in sugar, tobacco, and maritime unions.
Dominican Republic, May 1952.	Popular Socialist Party (PSPD) (illegal—based in Guatemala).	Dominican Party, etc.: 1,038,646 votes (100 percent), all seats.	Dominican Revolutionary Party (in exile).	Negligible (estimate), 2,000 (claim, 1947).	There may be individual Communists in the Dominican Republic but they are not identifiable as such. If they exist at all they are numerically insignificant. There is no evidence of a Communist underground organization.
Ecuador, June 1952.....	Communist Party (PCE): 1 seat (0.9 percent). Socialist Party (PSE): 4 seats (3.7 percent).	Velasquista Organization: 34 seats (31.2 percent).	Conservative Party: 30 seats (27.5 percent). Catholics: 15 seats (13.8 percent). Liberal Party: 22 seats (20.1 percent).	Under 5,000 (estimate), 2,500 (claim, 1947).	Communists find their chief source of support in intellectual and student circles and in the labor movement. Communist labor leaders share control of a large sector of organized labor with the Socialist Party. The latter, far larger and stronger than the Communist Party, has cooperated with the Com-

			Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP): 2 seats (1.8 percent).		
El Salvador, May 1952...	Communist Party (PCS) (illegal).	Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification (PRUD): 700,979 votes (99.9 percent), all seats.	-----	Under 1,000 (estimate).	<p>munists. Communists wield influence among school-teachers and certain youth and student groups in the larger cities and in the coastal region. The Velasco Ibarra government inaugurated in September 1952 has taken some steps to reduce Communist influence in the educational system and elsewhere.</p> <p>Communist activity is outlawed in El Salvador, but the party is active clandestinely in labor and student groups. The Osorio administration took steps during 1951 to repress the Communist labor entity, which had gained virtually uncontested leadership over organized labor. In September 1952 the administration announced the existence of a Communist plot against the Government, made sweeping arrests and exiled various Communist leaders. It continues to suppress Communist activities, and has been particularly alert to infiltration from Guatemala.</p>
Guatemala, January 1953	Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT): 4 seats (7 percent). Dropped name of Communist Party and registered as legal party in December 1952. Constitution prohibits "formation of . . . political organizations of international or foreign character." In 1953 elections Communists won 1 of 32 seats at issue, leaving their number in Congress 4, same as before. The other 3 were elected in 1950 on administration party slates. Other parties of ruling coalition include pro-Communist elements.	Revolutionary Action Party (PAR): 25 seats (44.6 percent). Party of the Guatemalan Revolution (PRG): 9 seats (16.1 percent). National Renovation (RN): 7 seats (12.5 percent). Ruling coalition includes Guatemalan Labor Party (Communist).	National Electoral Union, Patriotic Union, etc.: 5 seats (8.9 percent).	About 2,000 (estimate).	<p>Communist Party members in Guatemala and Communist sympathizers control organized labor and have attained influential positions in the administration parties and in the Government. Communists occupy 4 of the 56 seats in Congress. 3 of these ran as candidates of the administration parties in the December 1950 congressional elections. 1 was elected in January 1953 when the PGT was formally associated with the proadministration parties in the National Electoral Front. Communist labor leaders succeeded in organizing a united national labor federation in October 1951 which has increased Communist leverage in the political sphere. Communist leaders were instrumental in passage of an agrarian reform law in June 1952. By supporting the Government in implementing provisions of the law and by successfully infiltrating into the administrative machinery of the National Agrarian Department, they have extended their influence into rural areas. Little improvement can be looked for so long as the administration refuses to take seriously the international character of the Communist movement and the danger involved in continued toleration of and collaboration with the Communists.</p>
Haiti, October 1950.....	Communist Party (illegal). Popular Socialist Party (PSP) (illegal). Peasant Workers' Movement (MOP) (illegal).	Magloire Group.....	-----	Negligible (estimate), 500 (claim, 1947).	<p>The Communist movement in Haiti is very small. If it has any organization, it exists underground. The Communist Party and Communist-line parties are outlawed.</p>

Latin America—Continued

Country and date of last national parliamentary elections	National parliamentary status			Communist Party membership	Sources of Communist strength
	Communist and pro-Communist	Ruling party or coalition	Opposition		
Honduras, October 1948..	No Communist Party (illegal). Democratic Revolutionary Party (PDRH) (illegal).	Nationalist Party: 255,974 votes (99.9 percent), all seats.	Liberal Party, etc.: 514 votes.	Negligible (estimate).	There is no Communist Party as such in Honduras, but pro-Communists have been increasingly active. Communist operations seem to stem from Guatemala and to be aimed at the workers employed by the United States-owned corporations along the coast. The Government authorities in October 1953 moved to curb Communist agitation and closed down pro-Communist news organs.
Mexico, July 1952	Communist Party (PCM) (lacks membership required for electoral registration). Popular Party (PP): 2 seats (0.9 percent).	Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI): 201 seats (90 percent).	National Action Party (PAN): 5 seats (2.3 percent). Nationalist Party (PNM): 2 seats (0.9 percent). Federation of People's Parties (FPPM): 1 seat (0.5 percent).	Under 5,000 (estimate). 25,000 (claim, 1947).	Over a long period of time, Communists and pro-Communists had infiltrated into leading positions in Government and labor organizations. This trend was reversed under the Aleman administration, while dissensions within the Communist movement and loss of strength in the Government-influenced labor organizations further impaired the position of the Communists. The Communist-line Popular Party, formed in 1947 by Lombardo Toledano, head of the Latin-American Communist labor front, CTAL, retains the backing of segments of the oil, mining, and metallurgical unions. Lombardo's party is also the major moving force behind Communist propaganda fronts.
Nicaragua, May 1950....	Socialist Party of Nicaragua (PSN) (illegal).	National Liberal Party: 153,297 votes (75 percent), 40 seats (67 percent).	Conservative Party: 49,401 votes (25 percent), 20 seats (33 percent).	Under 500 (estimate). 500 (claim, 1947).	The Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Communist) has long been banned, and a number of key leaders are in exile in Guatemala. The Communists' once dominant position in the General Confederation of Workers (CGT) has been demolished. Although weakened and split, Communists still work in most trade unions as actively as their handicap permits.
Panama, May 1952.....	People's Party (PDP) (lacks membership required for national electoral registration) (illegal).	National Patriotic Coalition (CPN): 44 seats (83 percent).	National Liberal Party, etc.: 9 seats (17 percent).	Under 1,000 (estimate). 500 (claim, 1947).	The People's Party (Communist) finds its main support among youth-student and labor groups. Communists and pro-Communists have also infiltrated ultra-nationalist political groups and the school system. The Communists were among the leaders of anti-Romon student strikes in 1951-52. The Government has taken steps against Communist infiltration in the educational system, and, in December 1953, outlawed Communist activities.

Paraguay, February 1953.	Communist Party (PCP) (illegal).	Colorado Party: 224,788 votes (100 percent), all seats.	Liberal, Febrerista Parties (did not participate in elections).	Under 2,000 (estimate), 8,000 (claim, 1947).	The Communists have their main source of support abroad from Paraguayans or other Communist sympathizers. The Colorado administration has pursued a policy of suppressing Communist activity, and the Communists have failed to show any significant strength among labor groups, their major target. There is some evidence of Communist inroads in intellectual circles.
Peru, July 1950	Communist Party (PCP) (illegal).	Pro-Odria Group: 194 seats (95.6 percent).	Anti-Odria Independents: 5 seats (2.4 percent). Socialist Party: 4 seats (2 percent). Aprista Party (illegal)...	Under 10,000 (estimate), 35,000 (claim, 1947).	The Communist party has remained divided between the "orthodox" faction outlawed in October 1948 and dissident groups. The latter have had some freedom of action, but have not been effective in expanding their organization or influence. Communists of one or the other group have maintained a measure of influence among transportation, mining, and dockworkers.
Uruguay, November 1950.	Communist Party (PCU): 19,026 votes (2.3 percent), 2 seats (1.5 percent).	Colorado Party: 433,164 votes (52.3 percent), 71 seats (54.3 percent).	Herrerista, Independent Nationalist, Civic Union: 358,349 votes (43.3 percent), 55 seats (42.7 percent). Socialist Party: 17,401 votes (2.1 percent), 2 seats (1.5 percent).	15,000 (estimate), 15,000 (claim, 1947).	The Communist Party finds its main source of support among organized labor, local Slavic groups, and in intellectual circles. The Communist-dominated labor federation (UGT) reached the peak of its influence in the early postwar period and since 1948 has lost much of its former control over labor. In mid-1951, as the result of dissensions within the party and labor's resentment at Communist neglect of local issues for international Communist objectives, large-scale defections from the UGT occurred. The party's representation in Congress declined from 6 to 2 members in 1950 elections, indicating the extent to which it has lost a following. Despite these losses, the Communists still maintain a foothold in strategic sectors of the economy through their union affiliates, and, recognizing former errors, are making determined efforts to extend the audience for their propaganda.
Venezuela, April 1953....	Communist Party (PCV) (illegal). Revolutionary Proletarian Party (PRP-c) (dissident).	Independent Electoral Front (FEI) and other pro-Government groups received a large majority in both Houses of the National Congress designated by the Constituent Assembly in April 1953.	Copei Democratic Republican Union (URD). Venezuelan Socialist Party (PSV). Democratic Action (AD) (illegal).	Under 20,000 (estimate), 27,000 (claim, 1950).	The Venezuelan Government outlawed the principal Communist Party (PCV) in May 1950, and dissolved its petroleum federation and affiliates which had taken a leading part in an oilfield strike. PCV was thereby deprived of its major source of labor support. Since that time many PCV leaders have been arrested or exiled, or have gone into hiding. The smaller dissident Communist Party (PRP-c), which was not affected by the Government's action against the PCV, has had some following among oil workers as well as union affiliates in the Caracas area.

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(B) REGIONAL SUMMARY

(Reprinted from original edition)

COMMUNISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

A. STRENGTH

In the 16 countries of Western Europe the Communist parties have an estimated membership of approximately 3 million, and in national elections they poll about 13 million votes. Communist membership and electoral strength are not, however, evenly distributed throughout the area. Quite the contrary, the great bulk of Communist members and voters is found in Italy and France. These 2 countries together account for two-thirds of Western Europe's Communist members and 10½ of the 13 million Communist votes. Elsewhere Communist membership ranges from a few hundred, as in Ireland and Luxembourg, up to the 130,000 mark in West Germany. Aside from Italy and France, moreover, the Communist vote is quite small and usually amounts to about 5 percent of the total vote. The only exception is Iceland, where the Communist vote runs to 20 percent of the total vote—a figure not far under the 25-30 percent which the Communists poll in France and Italy.

In addition to their considerable membership and their sizable electoral support, the Communists of Western Europe have notable trade union strength. In Italy, particularly, but also in France, the largest national trade union federations are controlled by Communists. Elsewhere, with one minor exception in the Netherlands, the Communists do not dominate national union organizations. They do, however, frequently control locals, some of which are fairly large and located in industries important to the national economy.

Despite the size of their membership, their electoral strength, and their trade union support, the Communists have been excluded since the onset of the cold war from all those governments of Western Europe in which they were once present. Although Communists sit in the parliaments of 10 of the 16 Western European countries, they are isolated by the other parties to such an extent that they are prevented from directly participating in the formulation or administration of official policy.

In spite of the strength which the Communists still have they have lost heavily in membership and trade-union support during the past several years. Prior to 1947 the Communists were at peak strength, having recruited more members and won more followers during and immediately after the war than at any other time in their history. They were present in the governments of several countries, and, with few exceptions, had working relations with the non-Communist parties. During the past 5 years or so this whole picture has greatly changed. In addition to their decline in numbers the Communists have found themselves face to face with non-Communist parties which have be-

come increasingly anti-Communist and determined to curb the Communists. At no time in the past several years have the Communists been able to carry off successfully mass demonstrations or political strikes. In terms of electoral strength, however, the parties of Italy, France, and Iceland have succeeded in maintaining their postwar position virtually unchanged.

B. OBJECTIVES

The major short-range goal of the Communists in Western Europe is the detachment of their countries from the western alliance as the first step in the establishment of a situation in Western Europe which would be favorable to the Soviet Union. Short of this main immediate objective the Communists attempt to interfere with specific pro-western official policies such as rearmament within NATO and participation in the Korean and Indochinese wars. Always closely related to these efforts are the Communists' general attempts to weaken the present Western European governments and the whole economic and social fabrics of their countries. Finally, the Communists seek to create a psychological atmosphere which will undermine the confidence of Western Europe in its capacity for self-defense, disrupt the harmony of the Western European nations, and increase friction between them and the United States.

C. TACTICS

At the present time the Communists' prevailing tactic in Western Europe is that of the United National Front. In contrast with the Popular Front tactics of the 1930's, the present United National Front is not at this time an effort by the Communists to form alliances with entire non-Communist political parties and their leaders. It is, rather, an attempt to build up large popular movements by appealing to individuals from as many social, religious, and political groups as possible.

Dissatisfaction with prowestern foreign policies rather than a call for class struggle is the fundamental basis of current Communist appeals in Western Europe. Accordingly, the Communists say very little about political and economic issues which clearly separate them from non-Communists, and they avoid open advocacy of the use of force against their governments. Instead they set themselves up as the true nationalists of their countries, contending that their governments have sacrificed national interests and sold out to the United States while the Communists defend traditional national interests. In the same way the Communists claim that they alone protect democratic liberties and that they, therefore, should receive the cooperation of all those who want to safeguard these freedoms. Finally, the Communists continually strive to make themselves the mouthpiece of all those who are discontented, for a variety of reasons, with their governments and various aspects of the existing social and economic order.

The target groups of the Communists' United National Front tactics are very broad. The Communists have specifically said that they hope to attract bourgeois groups such as shopkeepers, businessmen, and professional people on the basis of their national appeals. In practice, however, the sectors on which the Communists concentrate are

more limited and include especially those groups which are dissatisfied with their social and economic status and their material living standards under conditions presently prevailing in their countries. Chief among these groups are urban workers, both white collar and manual, agricultural workers and some landholding farmers, and certain writers and artists who feel that the present social order is bankrupt.

In their efforts to exploit dissatisfaction with official policies and protest sentiment generally the Communists are not restricted to any single set of appeals. Instead they produce a variety of special appeals to various social and economic groups. Among industrial workers, for example, they invariably champion higher wages, while among agricultural groups they call for higher crop prices which would, in turn, reduce the industrial workers' purchasing power. They also tailor their propaganda to fit special localities and emphasize different propaganda points from area to area of a particular country.

In conducting this type of pinpointed propaganda the Communists have at their disposal a very extensive propaganda organization. Numerous newspapers, books, and magazines designed for many types of readers are published in nearly every country. In some countries Communist posters are a significant form of propaganda, as are signature campaigns and radio broadcasts beamed from the Soviet Union or the satellite bloc. Also among the methods which the Communists use in broadening their contacts are the front organizations. Such organizations are still of considerable, albeit declining importance, in Italy and France, while organizations of lesser size exist in West Germany and the United Kingdom, and only small ones remain in Scandinavia and Benelux. Finally, Communist-dominated trade unions, particularly in France, Italy, and Iceland are major vehicles for spreading Communist influence.

2. COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

A. OBJECTIVES

In a period of indigenous unrest that provides significant opportunities for Communism, the Communist parties of the Middle East, except potentially in Iran, still lack the strength to alter the structure of society by revolutionary action. Taking account both of their present weakness and their most promising opportunities, the Communists of the area have in recent years placed primary emphasis on discrediting the Western Powers, including the United States, rather than on destroying the internal bulwarks of reaction within each country. Everywhere, even in Iran, Communists have therefore two major immediate objectives: (1) To build a reliable and sizable cadre of trained Communists, and (2) to establish the broadest possible popular front with local nationalist groups opposed to political ties with the West. The latter aim receives the greatest emphasis in propaganda and organizational work, since a united front appears to be the best shortcut to success and also because the Communist cadre might be selected from among the most promising new allies.

1. *Iran*

In Iran, where the Soviet Union continues to press for the fulfillment of its two priority objectives—to separate Iran from the West and to

deprive the West of Iranian oil—the following factors are likely to shape events and determine whether the Communist Tudeh Party gains power: (1) The potentially revolutionary situation in Iran; (2) the increasing disintegration of the traditional social, political, and ideological framework; (3) Tudeh's own revolutionary impetus; and (4) the absence of any other major opposition to the Communist Party should the National Front or its major components disintegrate.

2. *The Arab States and Israel*

Should Iran turn Communist, the impact in the Arab world—given the basic weakness of many ruling groups and the discontent among the younger, more educated urban population—may improve the climate for Communist activities and cause Communists to become more aggressive.

For the time being, however, Communist objectives in the Arab world and Israel include, specifically, efforts to (1) bring about the dissolution of all formal local ties with the West; (2) render suspect all United States aid programs to the area; (3) deepen sentiment against any western-sponsored regional defense scheme; (4) encourage the nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises; (5) increase trade with the Soviet bloc; and ultimately (6) create, in the process of national liberation from western control, a more democratic and socialist state under Communist control.

B. TACTICS

Communist objectives are intrinsically related to Communist tactical requirements: Most of the specific aims are intended to appeal to the broadest possible segments of prevailing public opinion, to lead such opinion into Communist-controlled channels, and finally to pervert local nationalist and reformist drives to Soviet purposes.

In practice, however, the Communist parties of the Middle East and North Africa have been compelled by their own organizational and financial weakness to confine themselves to far more limited tactical maneuvers. They have exacerbated riots or helped to turn political demonstrations to violence, and thus increased tension with a limited expenditure of direct effort. They have used the Partisans of Peace, the only Communist front which has achieved any significant size in the area, and to some degree have infiltrated non-Communist organizations and newspapers to encourage further local hostility against military or political connections with the West. Their local opponents have, in general, tended to ascribe to them far greater powers of initiative, penetration, organization, and tactical prowess than the Communists presently possess. This tendency of some local governments to magnify Communist strength in the Arab world is often impelled by (1) a general feeling of insecurity; (2) a lack of precise information on this subject; (3) an uncertainty as to the nature of communism; (4) a maneuvering to shift the blame for violence on others; (5) a political strategy to define a large internal menace compelling national unity; and (6) a hope to tar the opposition with the Communist label.

There was no evidence that the Soviet emphasis on anti-Zionism in the winter of 1952–53 had been deliberately designed or was being used for Communist exploitation in the Arab world. Some Arab nationalists have found it useful to play up the difference in Soviet

and western attitudes on Zionism and the continued menace of Israel in pursuit of their own objectives. In Israel, the reinforced Soviet campaign against Zionism has seriously weakened Communist control over the extreme left wing of the country.

C. OPERATIONS

At present, the Communist Parties in the Middle East are small, reaching potentially dangerous proportions only in Iran. The parties in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel are probably next in size although they are considerably behind Iran in numbers. Factionalism and personal rivalries are endemic. The main support of the Communist Parties derives, not from the peasants and workers but from a smaller segment of middle eastern society—the new urban groups which are the source of present unrest and the potential source of power. Thus far, however, the Communists have converted only a small portion of this segment, many of them, moreover, members of religious and ethnic minorities. The bulk of the new urban groups – discontented, but unable entirely to renounce traditional symbols and aspirations—is pulled instead toward various local interpretations of national socialism.

Individual Communists have, in certain instances, been able to infiltrate official government and army positions. Communists also may have entered into tactical alliances against their common domestic and foreign foes with certain rightists and antiwestern fronts. Although present Soviet requirements permit the Communists to exploit the most popular theme, namely anti-imperialism, among the people of the area, they have been unable to capture the initiative in this campaign. Many nationalists are aware that this strategy is obviously based on immediate Soviet, rather than local, needs and distrust it. It has made the Communist Party almost indistinguishable from other local groups and the majority of those who feel strongly on imperialism have joined, instead, those parties which form the core of the nationalist movement. Communist tacticians have been forced to give second place to issues involving social discontent, but hence have left these to be exploited more directly by other extremist groups.

Present Communist weaknesses are not decisive facts in considering Communist prospects in the Middle East and North Africa. Science and industrialization have introduced into the era new methods in technology, production, administration, and distribution. Arabs and Iranians are becoming increasingly aware of the benefits to be derived from a new way of life. Whether communism can take advantage of opportunities inherent in this situation depends in no small measure on the skill and capacities of those who lead the forces arraigned against it. Unless those forces are effective, communism could increasingly pervert to its own ends the Middle East's pressing interest in progress and status.

3. COMMUNISM IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

Although there are individual Communists in Africa south of the Sahara, there are no organized Communist movements with the exception of an inconsequential party in French Equatorial Africa.

There are Communist elements in British West African nationalist and labor groups, but they exert little influence. Communist influence in British East and Central Africa, the Belgian Congo, and Portuguese African territories is insignificant.

Short-run Communist aims in this area are (1) to undermine western prestige; (2) to project an image of Soviet and Communist support of nationalist movements; and (3) to weaken and subvert established authority. The first and second aims have had very limited success; the third is, at present, beyond Communist strength.

Propaganda is centered on such native grievances as alleged or actual land expropriation, exploitation by European economic enterprise, and political, social, and economic discrimination. It has met with only limited success among its chief targets, which comprise disaffected nonwhites, particularly young intellectuals, nationalist activists, and organized labor. Efforts to attract the peasantry have been thwarted by preoccupation with family and tribal affairs, and natural barriers to communication.

Attempts to infiltrate nationalist and other dissident groups have not been very successful to date, although a few nationalist leaders have been exposed to Communist influence, which may be reflected in their tactics. Such influence is incidental, however, in current manifestations of anticolonial feeling, which are rooted in far more fundamental social and economic changes.

Communist capabilities, although limited at present, are likely to be enhanced increasingly by (1) racial tensions; (2) the rising political consciousness of the Africans; and (3) the dislocations and uncertainties arising from the breakdown of the traditional societies and the emergence of new economic, social, and political forms. Communist exploitation of these factors will largely depend on the ability of the colonial administrations to adjust to the changes which are taking place.

4. COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA

A. STRENGTH

During the period 1944-47 the Stalinist Communist parties in Latin America had some 330,000 members and polled an aggregate of about 1 million votes in various national elections. Since then party membership has fallen to about 200,000. In 12 of the 20 countries, the Communist Party is now officially suppressed. In none is it an important electoral factor. The Communists, as such, have no present prospect of gaining control over any Latin American government by electoral means. Their direct participation in national politics is significant only in Guatemala.

The Communists have extended their range and captured a following outside organized parties through front groups. They alleged 8 million signers for the Five-Power Peace Pact campaign in 1951 (about 5 percent of the area's population), and claim several millions of members of unions affiliated with the Communist-front Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL). While these claims are greatly exaggerated, the Communists may have retained the latent sympathy of a million or more Latin Americans. Organizationally, they have succeeded in establishing reliable Communists in key positions in strategic labor unions and in national labor federations. The Com-

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munists have also been able to penetrate Latin American educational systems, intellectual circles, and those patriotic organizations formed to give expression to the new spirit of ultranationalism. So long as Communist parties have cells in labor, student, intellectual, and nationalist groups, and Communist propaganda can play on their drives and discontents, as is now the case in many Latin American countries, Communist capabilities in the area are a factor with which to reckon.

B. OBJECTIVES

The Communist movement in Latin America has as its immediate overriding objective the location of political power in the hands of groups hostile to the United States. With this end in view the Communists are generally supporting any and all groups that pursue an anti-United States policy, including some that the Communists formerly denounced as Fascist and others that adopt an anti-United States line as a temporary expedient in the struggle for votes. The Communist alliance with Fascist-type political groups conflicts with Communist slogans in support of freedom and democracy which have been important symbols in the Communist propaganda offensive. Communist intransigence in demanding that political allies follow an anti-United States line also conflicts with the tendency of most political leaders to adopt a less extreme course once in power.

At the present time the Communist propaganda offensive is directed primarily against the military assistance agreements and participation of United States capital in the development of Latin American raw material resources. The Communists aim thereby to weaken Latin America's economic and military contribution to the West while spreading abroad a sinister picture of the United States as an exploiting, warmongering, imperialist power.

C. TACTICS

Latin American Communist parties have been following the strategy of the national liberation front with slogans barely distinguishable from those of most non-Communist progressive parties. The Communists present themselves as the vanguard of democracy fighting to give effect to objectives popularized by politicians seeking mass support—national independence, social justice, economic democracy, labor unity. In Communist propaganda these are made wholly dependent upon peace, elimination of imperialist (i. e., United States) exploitation, defeat of alleged United States plans to drag Latin America into war, and ousting of pro-United States leaders who are accused of conniving with United States monopolists and warmongers.

The execution of the national liberation front strategy varies with the local political climate and Communist strength. The Communists operate from an advantageous place within the administration coalition in Guatemala. In several countries they have sketched a policy of conditional support for regimes that are strongly nationalist and that the Communists hope will follow an anti-United States course. Elsewhere the Communist parties are in open opposition to the governments of the day. In general they pursue constitutional courses of action and only in Brazil and Colombia have Communist parties tended to abandon this line. Communist policy, whatever the Com-

unist political position of the day—within a government, in constitutional opposition, or in violent opposition—is consistent in two particulars: That is, in opposing political moderation that is necessary to orderly national development and in promoting anti-United States nationalism.

Under the “national liberation front” strategy, the Communists concentrate their efforts on social sectors that are active partisans of change—including labor, both manual and white-collar, professionals, especially writers and artists, and youth and women sectors of these groups. The primary Communist target groups are urban and they have grown in size and influence with the shift of population from rural to urban areas. The Communists would use influence gained in urban centers, as they are now doing in Guatemala, to promote radical agrarian reform, with the purpose of exploiting it for purely Communist objectives.

Front organizations to attract non-Communist support and extend the voice and audience of the Communist parties are of major importance to the tactics of Latin-American communism. The Communists organize labor, both urban and rural, youth-student groups, women, racial, and other front groups, using special appeals to each—labor unity, higher wages, agrarian reform, benefits to youth, women’s suffrage. The special-interest groups are then deployed to support appeals that cut across class and group lines, such as “peace,” nationalization of raw material resources, and the cancellation of infringements on sovereignty allegedly involved in collaboration with the United States. Latin-American Communists have received generous financial assistance from international Communist headquarters in the past 2 years in support of their program of developing front organizations. With this financing, the Latin-American Communists have organized trips for hundreds of fellow travelers as well as for Communists and a scattered few non-Communists to Communist front conferences in Europe and the Soviet orbit.

5. COMMUNISM IN ASIA

A. OBJECTIVES

The immediate short-term objectives of Communist movements in non-Communist Asia are conditioned by such factors as:

1. The military reverses suffered since 1951 by all Communist insurgent movements in Asia, except the Viet Minh in Indochina, and the adverse repercussions of the Japanese Communist tactics of violence in the first half of 1952.

2. The growing coalescence of non-Communist forces in many parts of Asia.

3. The demonstrated Western determination to resist further Communist inroads, particularly those involving identifiable aggression of the Korean type.

4. The existence in Asia, despite the above factors, of actual or potential areas of general susceptibility to Communist appeals.

The above factors appear to have led since about 1951 to a re-orientation of immediate Communist objectives and tactics in Asia. After 1946 armed uprisings were initiated in some southeast Asian areas, although earlier efforts to create “coalition” regimes and to

negotiate continued. By 1948 these uprisings had developed into a general offensive, with Communist uprisings in every country in southeast Asia except Thailand. The objectives and strategy of armed struggle were given public formulation at the 1949 Peiping conference of Asian and Australasian trade unions and found their most extreme expression in the Communist attack on South Korea in June 1950. Since the failure of the Communist offensives in Korea in the spring of 1951 there have been no corresponding efforts to extend the area of Communist control in Asia except for the continuing offensives in Indochina. Although armed struggle continues in every country except Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia, Communist tactics are designed primarily to neutralize or deny to the West areas of non-Communist control and to conserve and strengthen Communist forces for operations in the indefinite future.

Specifically, short-term Communist objectives in Asia include the following:

1. *The conservation of existing military potentials wherever possible.*—This may include efforts to maintain hard-pressed military formations through political means (negotiations or offers of conditional cooperation with former enemies). It may involve the secretion of caches of arms, the creation of covert "hard core" military or paramilitary formations, and where possible the evacuation of insurgent forces to "base areas" made relatively secure by geographic isolation or proximity to Communist China. In Indochina, where the Communists have the most favorable military prospects, this tactic includes efforts to seize additional territory combined with efforts to create consolidated areas of Communist strength around existing bases.

2. *Reduction of Asian cooperation with the West and of Asian determination to resist communism.*—This includes opposition to the acceptance of United States military and economic aid, to bilateral or regional defense arrangements, and to restrictions on trade and diplomatic intercourse with Communist China and the U. S. S. R. It also includes the diversion of "neutralist" tendencies among Asians into pro-Soviet, pro-Communist channels, and emphasis on the economic and other gains to be derived from cooperation with Communist countries. Indigenous Communist movements and the Communist bloc will be pictured as having only "peaceful" objectives and tactics, and their willingness to cooperate with non-Communists will be stressed. The Communists may make efforts to weaken pro-Western or anti-Communist governments through expedient political maneuvers and cooperation with opposition groups of whatever political persuasion.

3. *Creation of a potential for future operations.*—Throughout its current activities, each Communist movement in Asia is aware of the need to maintain a tightly disciplined party and to avoid alliances that restrict party independence.

4. *Support of world Communist policies.*—Each national Communist movement is obligated to support world Communist objectives by all means at its disposal, including espionage activities, aid to insurgent or party groups in adjoining countries, and participation in world Communist propaganda activities.

The Communist movements of the area appear to be operating at the present in pursuit of short-term, limited objectives that are fairly well in accord with actual conditions in the individual countries.

The parties are not being asked to engage in costly or suicidal military adventures to further some broader world Communist objective, nor have they so far been asked to initiate a strategic retreat that might in individual cases represent a sacrifice of major objectives already gained. This does not mean, however, that the individual parties are pursuing purely national objectives. The individual parties continue to be enjoined to support all actions of the Soviet bloc, even if these should appear prejudicial to the national interests of individual countries or to the "peaceful" pose a party may be trying to assume. Beyond this, the individual parties are apparently obligated to assign top priority to the objective of preventing or minimizing the effectiveness of Asian cooperation with the West in order to "neutralize" non-Communist Asia in the East-West struggle. It is conceivable that the primacy of this objective may occasionally prevent the Communists from extending their influence among groups with a mild anti-Soviet or pro-United States bias but otherwise susceptible to Communist propaganda. Conversely, the Communists may occasionally collaborate with right-wing groups which are inimical to other Communist objectives but exhibit "neutralist" or anti-United States tendencies.

B. TACTICS

1. *Variation in tactics from country to country*

In attempting to further their current objectives, the national Communist movements of Asia are resorting to a wide range of tactical devices:

a. *Indonesia*.—The party operates overtly, is represented in the provisional parliament, and has offered its qualified support to the government of Premier Wilopo. The party dominates the trade union movement, but has recently chosen not to exercise even its limited potential for disruption and violence.

b. *Burma*.—The party is continuing the rebellion begun in 1948, and is attempting to create an effective united front of insurgent groups and to concentrate its military activities in secure base areas. However, the party has suffered military reverses and has made repeated conditional overtures to the Government for a cessation of hostilities. Meanwhile, Communist elements also operate aboveground and are represented in Parliament through the Communist-controlled Burma Workers and Peasants Party.

c. *Malaya*.—The Communist movement operates primarily among the Chinese half of the population and has been in open rebellion since 1948. The Communists have recently appeared to modify their guerrilla tactics to reduce terroristic actions likely to arouse popular antipathy. The party is reportedly planning to extend its efforts to infiltrate non-Communist organizations of all types.

d. *Philippines*.—The party is engaged in open rebellion through its military arm, the People's Liberation Army (HMB). Following recent cease-fire and amnesty feelers by HMB and party leaders, local negotiations between the Government and the insurgents reportedly have taken place. The party is reportedly attempting to shift the emphasis of its activities from guerrilla warfare to other covert and overt activities, including infiltration into non-Communist organizations.

e. *Thailand*.—The most effective part of the Thai Communist movement operates among the 3 million Chinese. The movement among the Thais is small and ineffectual, limited primarily to propaganda activities. It alone among southeast Asian parties did not initiate an insurrection in the 1946-48 period.

f. *Indochina*.—In Communist-controlled areas, the Communist (Laodong) Party operates much as do Communist parties in other Communist-bloc areas. In the areas controlled by the Governments of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, on the other hand, the Communists operate covertly, with emphasis on subversion, infiltration, intimidation, propaganda, and other activities in support of the Indochinese rebellion.

g. *Japan*.—The party has responded to a steady decline in strength and influence, to increased government suppression, and to the adverse reaction occasioned by its resort to violence during the first half of 1952, by shifting its emphasis to "legal" activities. The party campaigned vigorously in the 1952 and 1953 general elections and has sought to stress those objectives it holds in common with other groups in opposition to the Yoshida government. At the same time the party has been engaged in the creation of an effective and disciplined underground organization, including paramilitary units.

2. *Common features of tactics throughout region*

Despite the diversity of military and political devices used by the Communist movements in Asia, ranging from legal parliamentary activities to a full-scale modern war, there are certain underlying factors common to the tactics of most of the movements described above:

a. *Armed struggle*.—The methods of guerrilla warfare developed by the Communists in China and elsewhere underlie Communist tactics throughout Asia. Armed struggle is a key concept in the Communist strategy for seizing power in areas like Asia; indeed it is to be questioned whether orthodox Communists consider seizure and consolidation of power possible without ultimate resort to violence. Even in areas where actual insurrection may be in abeyance, as in Japan or Indonesia, or where it may be deemphasized in favor of other tactics, as in Burma or the Philippines, the probability that "armed struggle" will eventually come to the fore is basic to Communist political warfare tactics.

b. *United front and unified action*.—At the present time in Asia, except in Indochina, the armed struggle aspect of Communist tactics is receding into the background, and nonmilitary means of political warfare calculated to achieve the objectives outlined under (I) above, are coming into the fore. Nonviolent Communist tactics are now no longer aimed merely at supporting a military struggle and disrupting governmental processes; the Communists may even go so far as to lend their conditional support to groups that are basically anti-Communist but at the same time potentially antiwestern or neutralist.

It is becoming clear that in Asia the Communists have not entered into united front tactics with the same sense of urgency that characterized the united front of 1935. The Communists, for example, have not sacrificed major elements of their revolutionary program, have not entered into significant strategic retreats, and have not fully

abandoned armed struggle. Nor have they formed or offered to form alliances with non-Communist groups except under conditions of virtual surrender to at least a part of the Communist program.

The Communists in Asia are now posing as the defenders of national independence against the threat of Western and United States aggression as represented by United States and Western military and economic aid, efforts to create anti-Communist alliances, and restrictions on trade and other relations with the Communist bloc. Similarly, the Communists are posing as the only true defenders of peace. On the domestic scene this takes the form of demands that operations against Communist insurgents should cease. On the international scene the defense of peace is in terms of opposition to Western anti-Communist policies. The Communists are engaged in creating in each country a united front in support of the slogans of national independence and peace, but only groups accepting the Communist definition of these slogans are admitted, with the result that the united front remains Communist-controlled without significant independent participation. Organizationally the united front takes the form of peace movements and loose organizations of various Communist-led parties, trade unions, etc., in none of which Communist control is effectively masked.

Beyond the comparatively narrow concept of a united front the Communists in Asia are participating in unified actions to achieve specific objectives in cooperation with non-Communists, without sacrificing Communist organizational and tactical independence. Under this concept, Communist insurgents in Burma have offered their qualified cooperation to the Government to engage in joint military operations against the Chinese Nationalist troops in eastern Burma, and Communists in Indonesia have offered their qualified support to the Wilopo government. In Japan, the party has campaigned vigorously in the elections of 1952 and 1953, stressing those objectives it holds in common with other opposition parties, both left and right. The concept of unified action makes it possible for Asian Communists to work within organizations such as trade unions, even if these are controlled by non-Communists or otherwise ineligible or unwilling to participate in a formal united front.

The tactics of united front and unified action have not been fully developed in Asia, but they are sufficiently widespread, under a variety of names, to suggest that they will be generally resorted to as local conditions permit.

c. International coordination.—The diversity of tactics and the Communist regard for local conditions in Asia should not be taken to imply that international coordination of the Communist movements of the area is confined to the generalized coordination of objectives described in section (I) above. The coordination extends also to specific local Communist activities, most of which are linked to a corresponding world Communist tactic or program.



Communist-led insurrections, particularly in Malaya and Indochina, are thus described in Communist propaganda as akin to the Korean war and part of the worldwide struggle against imperialism. Communist efforts to obtain cease-fire or amnesties for insurgents are linked to world peace campaigns. Communist efforts to relax restrictions on trade and other intercourse with the Communist bloc are

linked to Soviet coexistence propaganda, as are local united front and unified action campaigns.

The international coordination illustrated by such examples serves to give diverse activities a unified theme and helps to break the isolation of individual Communist movements by linking them to a worldwide movement. The Communists lose no opportunity to demonstrate the worldwide support of individual nationwide Communist-sponsored activities.

The Communist movements in Asia are aided in the pursuit of their present objectives by the fact that Communist China provides a secure base for leadership, coordination, advice, and material aid that lies beyond the range of the individual Asian governments, and by the fact that the slogans and causes currently espoused by the Communists have a wide appeal in Asia. At the same time, the Communist movements have to reckon with a widespread fear in Asia of the expansive aspects of international communism, as represented by the Soviet Union and China, and with growing suspicions of indigenous Communist motives created by the repeated shifts in Communist policies (from coalition to armed struggle to peace) and by demonstrations of the international loyalties of individual Communist movements. The impact of local Communist movements and their resources in arms, men, and propaganda themes varies widely from country to country. In general, the strength, determination, and stability of Asian non-Communist governments has significantly reduced the strength of indigenous Communists. However, international developments could at any time reverse a favorable trend. In the final analysis, the potential of international communism in Asia will depend upon a combination of local and international factors: the effectiveness of western policy in Asia; local military, economic, and political conditions; developments in the Indochinese and Korean wars; the level and character of Chinese Communist aid to Communist groups; and developments in the cold war both in Asia and outside the region.







AN EXPLANATION OF THE USE OF
AN AZIMUTHAL EQUIDISTANT CHART

The projection on which this chart is constructed possesses the unique property of showing as a straight line the Great Circle course and distance to any point in the map area from the point of construction, which is the center point. By using the bar scale at the bottom of the chart, the Great Circle distance may be measured either in statute or nautical miles.

Although the Great Circle property is extended to a limited area adjacent to the center of construction, the Great Circle routes and distances may be found more accurately by using the nomograph (20-94) constructed for this chart.




AN EXPLANATION OF THE USE OF AN AZIMUTHAL EQUIDISTANT CHART


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A.A.F. EQUIDISTANT CHART CENTERED NEAR SVERDLOVSK, U.S.S.R.




LAMBERT AZIMUTHAL EQUAL AREA PROJECTION OF
THE NORTHERN HEMISPHERE



ALL DISTANCES FROM CENTER OF PROJECTION ARE CORRECT

Black star adjacent to Sverdlovsk, U.S.S.R., is center of the projection.

The latest provisional boundaries between the U. S. S. R. and the eastern European countries have been shown. In instances where territorial differences are under discussion pre World War II boundaries have been indicated. Otherwise, boundaries are as of date of completion.



LAMBERT AZIMUTHAL EQUAL AREA PROJECTION OF
THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE

